Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year

Faculty Publications

1-1-2014

Bottom Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An
Empirical Analysis
Charlotte S. Alexander
Georgia State University College of Law, calexander@gsu.edu

Arthi Prasad

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 Ind. L.J. 1069 (2014).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement:
An Empirical Analysis
CHARLOTTE S. ALEXANDER* & ARTHI PRASAD**
This Article presents an original analysis of newly available data from a
landmark survey of 4387 low-wage, front-line workers in the three largest U.S.
cities. We analyze data on worker claims, retaliation, and legal knowledge to
investigate what we call “bottom-up” workplace law enforcement, or the reliance
of many labor and employment statutes on workers themselves to enforce their
rights. We conclude that bottom-up workplace law enforcement may fail to protect
the workers who are most vulnerable to workplace rights violations, as they often
lack the legal knowledge and incentives to complain that are prerequisites for
enforcement activity.
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INTRODUCTION
Workplace rights in the United States are generally enforced from the bottom
up. With few exceptions, labor and employment laws contain private rights of
action that enable workers themselves to bring lawsuits when their rights are
violated.1 These private lawsuits vastly outnumber government enforcement actions
against law-breaking employers.2 Even what seems to be top-down government
enforcement is often bottom-up enforcement in disguise, as government agencies
depend in large part on worker complaints to direct their enforcement activity.3

1. The Occupational Safety and Health Act and, in large part, the National Labor
Relations Act are significant exceptions, as workers themselves may not sue to enforce
statutory health and safety protections or prohibitions on unfair labor practices. Michael J.
Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 731–32 (2003)
(discussing the lack of a private right of action under the OSHA and NLRA).
2. Between fiscal years 1997 and 2012, for example, the number of cases filed by
private plaintiffs in federal court to enforce civil rights employment laws was forty-eight
times the number of cases filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). Compare EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm
(listing 5705 EEOC enforcement suits filed in the federal district courts in fiscal years 1997
through 2012), with Supplements Table C-2A: Cases Commenced by Nature of Suit,
Judicial Business Archive, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness
/archive.aspx (listing annual reports identifying 274,422 “Civil Rights Employment” and
“ADA—Employment” cases filed by private plaintiffs in federal district court in fiscal years
1997 through 2012). Likewise, between fiscal years 2000 and 2011, private plaintiffs filed
thirty-eight times more Federal Fair Labor Standards Act cases than did the U.S. Department
of Labor. Author-compiled data, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)
(finding 1382 cases with the FLSA Nature of Suit code filed in federal court by the U.S.
Secretary of Labor versus 52,865 cases filed by private plaintiffs) (on file with authors).
3. For example, almost all lawsuits brought by the EEOC, which enforces federal
antidiscrimination statutes, begin as worker-filed charges. Though the EEOC may
affirmatively initiate an investigation using a mechanism known as a commissioner charge,
this charge is rarely used, with only twelve charges filed in fiscal year 2012. Performance
and Accountability Report: FY2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2012par_performance.cfm (“[I]n FY 2012, 12 new
Commissioner charges were filed.”). The U.S. Department of Labor may also initiate its own
affirmative “directed investigations,” but those are vastly outnumbered by complaint-driven
investigations. DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC
ENFORCEMENT
8
(2010),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources
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Workplace law enforcement therefore depends significantly on worker “voice,”
with workers themselves identifying violations of their rights and making claims to
enforce them.4
In theory, a bottom-up system should produce an accessible, responsive, and
efficient workplace law enforcement regime. The parties with the most information
about violations and the greatest incentive to correct them—the workers—drive the
enforcement process.5 Workers need not wait on cumbersome, budget-strapped, or
politically hamstrung government agencies, but can take enforcement duties into
their own hands.6 And when government agencies do act, the bottom-up system
should allow them to allocate resources efficiently: the “market” in complaints
should signal to agencies which employers are bad actors in need of reform.7
However elegantly designed, there is good reason to believe that the system fails
in practice, and that it fails particularly badly in the case of workers who are most
vulnerable to workplace rights violations.8 These workers include women, those

/strategicEnforcement.pdf (reporting that over 75% of U.S. Department of Labor Wage and
Hour Division investigations in 2008 arose from worker complaints, as opposed to
agency-initiated complaints in accordance with the Department’s strategic enforcement
priorities); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement
Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 556 (2010) (“The
[U.S. Department of Labor] is thus expending most of its resources on inspectors responding
to complaints filed by individual workers, without an underlying justification that this
approach is likely to be effective in detecting violators.”).
4. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970) (defining a worker’s choices when faced
with a problem within her organization as exit, voice, and loyalty: “Voice is here defined as
any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of
affairs . . . .”); see also Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)
(“For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to secure compliance with
prescribed standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of
payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and complaints received from employees
seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.”). But see HIRSCHMAN, supra at 21–
25 (discussing the option to “exit,” or take one’s labor or business elsewhere); id. at 76–105
(discussing a “theory of loyalty”).
5. See Gideon Yaniv, Complaining About Noncompliance with the Minimum Wage
Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 351, 351–52 (1994) (“Being the direct (and sole) victims of
noncompliance, underpaid workers are naturally perceived as the faithful guardians of the
minimum wage law.”).
6. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376–77 (2005) (“Private lawsuits can potentially help to fill the
enforcement gap left by the undercommitment of public resources; indeed, they can
sometimes supply a big gun where public enforcement has none to wield.”).
7. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and
the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y. J. 59, 70
(2005) (“Ideally, regulators would like to assume two things: (1) that the workers who are
complaining are voicing legitimate grievances and representing them accurately (in other
words, that employees working under lawful conditions are not complaining); and (2) that
workers who are experiencing violations will complain.” (emphasis in original)).
8. See, e.g., id. at 73 (finding “only modest overlap between [worker] complaints and
[employer] compliance” with the Fair Labor Standards and Occupational Safety and Health
Acts).
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with less education, nonunionized workers, and undocumented workers, all of
whom hold relatively disempowered positions both in the workplace and in society
as a whole.9 The system fails these workers because it is built on two foundational,
misplaced assumptions: (1) that workers have the substantive and procedural legal
knowledge to identify violations of their rights and access the proper enforcement
procedures, and (2) that workers have sufficient incentives to file suit or make
agency complaints.10 Using a rich source of newly available survey data, this
Article demonstrates that for many low-wage, front-line workers—those who earn
below the median wage for the city where they live and hold nonmanagerial,
nonsupervisory, or nontechnical jobs—neither assumption applies.
This Article analyzes data that were originally collected as part of the 2008
Unregulated Work Survey, a landmark study of 4387 low-wage, front-line workers
in the three largest U.S. cities (New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles).11 These data
are valuable, as they include “hidden” groups such as undocumented people or day
laborers who are often excluded from research due to their marginalized social,
political, and economic statuses. The data are also important because they enable
empirical analyses of the determinants of claiming behavior and the transformation
of problems into legal claims, subjects of much study within the sociolegal,
economic, and political science literatures.12 Finally, analyses such as these are
important as a policy matter. As Steven Willborn puts it, as “policymakers sort
through the many choices available when they are deciding how to enforce a labor
statute,” they should be guided by both theory and data on the flaws and benefits of
our current system of workplace law enforcement.13
Our analysis reveals gaps in workers’ legal knowledge and powerful incentives
to stay silent in the face of workplace problems. First, the data show that more than
three-quarters of surveyed workers did not know where to file a government
complaint about a problem on the job, and almost 60% of these workers
misunderstood their minimum wage and overtime rights.14 The data also suggest
that female and undocumented workers had less accurate procedural legal
knowledge than their male and documented counterparts.15 Legal knowledge

9. See generally infra Part III (reporting results pertaining to women, nonunionized,
less educated, and undocumented workers).
10. Steven Willborn describes workers’ lack of legal knowledge and lack of incentives
slightly differently, as problems with detection and discovery of labor regulation violations
and problems with prosecution. Steven L. Willborn, Labor Enforcement Theory: The Case of
Public vs. Private Enforcement, in REGULATING DECENT WORK (Colin Fenwick & John
Howe eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 3).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part I.
13. Willborn, supra note 10, at 1 (“The consequences of [the differences in types of]
labor enforcement are under-studied empirically. Labor enforcement theory, if anything, is
even less well-studied. This is unfortunate, in part, because only a well-developed theory can
help policymakers sort through the many choices available when they are deciding how to
enforce a labor statute. Moreover, a well-developed theory is necessary to guide researchers
in their efforts to understand both general issues of labor enforcement and particular issues
relating to specific legislation.”).
14. See infra Part III.D–E.
15. See infra Part III.D–E.

2014]

BOTTOM-UP WORKPLACE LAW ENFORCEMENT

1073

therefore appears to decrease with a worker’s relative power and stability, and
many workers simply may not have the information necessary to become
workplace law enforcers.
Second, even informed workers may lack an incentive to exercise “voice” on the
job. The data show that about 43% of workers who had experienced a workplace
problem within the twelve months prior to the survey decided not to make a
claim.16 The most common reason for workers’ silence was their fear of employer
retaliation; the second was their belief that their claim would have no effect.17 Their
fear of retaliation was well founded: about 43% of workers reported experiencing
employer retaliation as a result of their most recent claim about a justiciable
workplace problem in the twelve months before the survey.18 Likewise, workers’
lack of faith in the efficacy of claiming was borne out by the data, as only about
15% of employers addressed the claim or promised to address it.19
Though workplace laws offer a set of protections and inducements to entice
workers to become law enforcers—what we call “operational rights”20—these
incentives are miscalibrated in the case of many low-wage, front-line workers,
whose fear of retaliation or doubt in the efficacy of complaining outweigh the
benefits that would accrue from workplace law enforcement.21
The data suggest, then, that low-wage, front-line workers such as the cashiers,
parking lot attendants, and dishwashers captured by the Unregulated Work Survey
may be particularly unsuited as bottom-up rights enforcers. At the same time,
numerous studies have shown that workplace rights violations are extraordinarily
prevalent in the very industries that employ these workers.22 Thus, the same
low-wage, front-line workers who are the most likely to experience workplace
rights violations may be the least likely to become rights enforcers. Workers are
overdeterred from claiming, and employers may be underdeterred from complying,
creating a self-perpetuating enforcement gap in labor and employment law.23

16. See infra Part III.A–B.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. See infra Part IV.A; see also Charlotte S. Alexander, Explaining Peripheral Labor:
A Poultry Industry Case Study, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 353, 386 (2012) (using the
term “operational rights” to refer to the set of incentives and protections designed to
operationalize or effectuate substantive rights, to entice workers to become bottom-up law
enforcers).
21. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88
TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2010) (“Legislators, as well as adjudicators, must consider
tailoring the incentives embedded in the law to the misconduct and the individual that it
targets as an enforcer.”).
22. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
23. Estlund, supra note 6, at 330 (“Traditional enforcement mechanisms have often
failed to raise the cost of noncompliance high enough to outweigh the immediate gains from
noncompliance. Most enforcement actions secure only the back wages owed to employees
(if that); that means opportunistic employers risk very little by underpaying employees and
hoping—quite realistically—to avoid enforcement, either by inspection or complaint . . . .
Simply ignoring the law is an especially tempting strategy for marginal producers at the
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews previous work in the sociolegal,
economic, and political science literatures that provides a theoretical framework for
the present analysis. Part II describes the methodology of the 2008 Unregulated
Work Survey, the data collected, and our own analysis. Part III reports our findings
on the frequency of worker claims, the prevalence of retaliation against workers
who did make claims, the level of workers’ substantive and procedural legal
knowledge, and workers’ incentives to engage in enforcement activity. Part IV
discusses the implications of a rights enforcement regime that leaves out the most
vulnerable workers. Part V concludes by examining possible alternative structures
for workplace law enforcement.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This Article fits into a tradition within the sociolegal, economic, and political
science literatures of studying the determinants of claiming behavior and provides
an opportunity to expand on existing models. The classic framework for
understanding the transformation of problems into legal claims comes from
William Felstiner and his coauthors.24 In this view, problems move through three
phases: naming, blaming, and claiming.25 First, a person must “say[] to [her]self
that a particular experience has been injurious.”26 This is naming. Second, she must
“attribute[] [the] injury to the fault of another individual or social entity”—
blaming.27 Third, in the process of claiming, she voices her grievance “to the
person or entity believed to be responsible and asks for some remedy.”28
Richard Miller, Austin Sarat, and Marc Galanter, among others, propose a more
complex dispute generation and resolution pyramid, with additional layers beyond
claiming.29 The pyramid accounts for claims that are disputed by the opposing
bottom of the production chain, who have little fixed capital or stake in their reputation, who
tend to operate under the regulatory radar, and who often rely heavily on undocumented
immigrant workers who are too fearful or desperate to complain.” (footnotes omitted)); see
also David Weil, “Broken Windows,” Vulnerable Workers, and the Future of Worker
Representation, FORUM, Jan. 2012, at 1, 1 (“In the presence of persistent violations, keeping
one’s head down, ‘staying out of other people’s business,’ and turning a blind eye to unfair
treatment of others is a survival strategy.”).
24. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631,
635–36 (1980–81).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 635.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 635–36.
29. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4, 11 (1983); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 545 (1980–81); see
also Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 681
(“At the base of the dispute pyramid are perceived injurious experiences—the broad mass of
injuries that people recognize. Some proportion of these perceived injurious experiences are
grievances: injuries that involve a violation of right or entitlement. . . . Only some grievances
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party and the resulting suit filing and disposition in court, and the pyramid’s shape
reflects the fact that many “named” problems—the wide bottom layers—never
progress all the way through to litigation at the pyramid’s peak.30
In a separate strand of economics literature, Albert Hirschman’s seminal work
examines problems that arise within organizations such as the workplace.31
Hirschman posits that people have three options in such circumstances: exit, voice,
and loyalty.32 Exit is the option to take one’s labor elsewhere; voice is a worker’s
attempt “to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs”;
and loyalty can result in a decision to remain within the organization and silently
withstand recognized problems.33 In many ways, Hirschman’s “voice” can be
thought of as Felstiner’s “claiming.”
The present Article takes this prior work as the starting point for investigating
the empirics of workplace dispute generation and resolution and for constructing a
more complex model that incorporates workers’ legal knowledge and incentive
structures. Figure 1 illustrates how such a model might look, presenting the
panoply of options that workers face when identifying problems on the job and
deciding whether and how to address them. The darkened arrows represent a direct
path from problem identification to claim resolution using formal legal means such
as a lawsuit or government agency complaint. This is the path that our current
system of bottom-up workplace law enforcement envisions: workers have the legal
knowledge to engage in “naming”; they then “blame” the appropriate party and are
incentivized and knowledgeable enough to exercise “voice,” to make a “claim” in
the form of a lawsuit or agency complaint and pursue it through resolution.
However, as the complexity of the diagram illustrates, there are many alternative
paths. And as the diminishing size of each pyramid layer indicates, many problems
“escape” along the way. Workers may not have the substantive legal knowledge to
recognize justiciable problems (violations of their legal rights at work) as such.34
Workers who “name” the problems they face may nevertheless choose exit or
loyalty over voice, or may not know who to “blame,” as a legal matter, for the
issues they face. Workers who do make claims may be faced with inaction or
become claims: when an individual contacts the party allegedly responsible for the
grievance. Fewer still are disputes: when the party allegedly responsible for an individual’s
claim initially denies their responsibility. Some number of disputes results in filings: a
formal complaint (in a litigation model, a court filing). The smallest category of all is made
up of trials: cases that are adjudicated.” (emphases omitted) (footnotes omitted)).
30. Galanter, supra note 29, at 11–26 (describing the pyramid).
31. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4.
32. Id. at 21–35 (discussing exit); id. at 30 (discussing voice); id. at 76–105 (discussing
loyalty).
33. See id. at 21–25 (discussing exit), id. at 30 (discussing voice); id. at 76–105
(discussing loyalty, which, in the alternative, might result in a decision to stay within the
organization and exercise voice).
34. Justiciable problems are those that “raise issues in civil law, have civil legal aspects,
and have consequences shaped by civil law.” Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of
Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
949, 968 (2009) (footnote omitted). See generally HAZEL GENN WITH SARAH BEINART,
STEVEN FINCH, CHRISTOS KOROVESSIS & PATTEN SMITH, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE
DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW (1999) (setting out theory of justiciable problems,
unmet legal needs, and access to justice).
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retaliation by their employers, at which point they may choose exit or loyalty, or
may start again at the bottom of the pyramid and progress through the steps of
“naming,” “blaming,” and choosing whether or not to make a retaliation “claim.”
Moreover, if a claim is escalated and becomes a lawsuit or agency complaint, the
worker’s incentive structure must push her to pursue the claim to resolution in
whatever form it takes (e.g., win or loss at trial, case dismissal, settlement). The
costs of formal legal action in time and treasure may build over the duration of the
process, and the worker may be retaliated against at any point, which then triggers
its own decision tree. Throughout the process, the worker’s incentive structure must
continue to encourage pursuit of her claim; for her to persevere through the claim’s
resolution, the benefits of claiming must consistently outweigh its costs.

Figure 1. Workplace dispute pyramid.

Thus, this more complex workplace dispute generation and resolution pyramid
synthesizes Hirschman’s theories with those of Felstiner and his progeny. It also
adds to the model the concepts of substantive and procedural legal knowledge and
incentives as prerequisites for problem identification, the transformation of
problems into claims, and then those claims’ resolution.
The very complexity of the model suggests that the simplistic assumptions
behind our bottom-up workplace law enforcement regime (indicated by the
darkened arrows in Figure 1) may be misplaced. Workers do not simply progress
through a process of naming, blaming, claiming, and claim resolution; they must at
every step choose among alternatives and have the legal knowledge and appropriate
incentive structure to encourage progression.
The pyramid also raises many empirical questions. Which workers have the
substantive legal knowledge to recognize certain workplace problems as justiciable
rights violations? Which workers have the procedural legal knowledge required to
transform their claims into lawsuits or agency complaints? Which workers choose
exit or silent loyalty over voice, at which stage in the process, and why? What
forms of extralegal dispute resolution might workers be accessing as alternatives to
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court, and how do those mechanisms work? How are workers’ incentive
structures—their assessments of claiming’s costs and benefits—functioning to
encourage or discourage claiming? How do those incentives shift and change over
the course of the process, and do they work differently for claims of different type
and magnitude? Finally, as a policy matter, how do we want these incentive
structures to function, and what are the implications for our bottom-up workplace
law enforcement regime?
The data presented in this Article provide an opportunity to examine some of
these questions, focusing on low-wage, front-line workers as potential workplace
rights enforcers. In particular, this Article investigates which of these workers make
claims on the job, the prevalence of retaliation against workers who do engage in
claiming behavior, the level of workers’ substantive and procedural legal
knowledge, and workers’ incentives to engage in claiming activity. However, these
data also leave many questions unanswered, paving the way for additional future
research.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. 2008 Unregulated Work Survey
The data analyzed in this Article were originally collected as part of the 2008
Unregulated Work Survey, a large-scale study of 4387 low-wage, front-line
workers in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. With foundation funding, the
study was conducted by researchers from the National Employment Law Project,
the University of Illinois at Chicago’s Center for Urban Economic Development,
and the UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, in partnership
with researchers at Cornell University, the City University of New York, Rutgers
University, and the UCLA Downtown Labor Center. The survey team originally
published some of its findings in a 2009 report, Broken Laws, Unprotected
Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities,35 and
released its full data set to outside researchers, including the present authors, for the
first time in January 2012.
The survey targeted workers in each city who were at least eighteen years old
and who worked in industries where the median wage was less than 85% of the city
median wage.36 Workers also had to hold “front-line,” or nonmanagerial,
nonsupervisory, and nontechnical jobs.37 Workers surveyed included cooks and
dishwashers, car-wash workers, groundskeepers, maids and housekeepers, parking
lot attendants, cashiers, cafeteria workers, tellers, garment workers, teacher’s
assistants, and security guards.38 Their median hourly wage was $8.02. Each

35. ANNETTE BERNHARDT, RUTH MILKMAN, NIK THEODORE, DOUGLAS HECKATHORN,
MIRABAI AUER, JAMES DEFILIPPIS, ANA LUZ GONZÁLEZ, VICTOR NARRO, JASON
PERELSHTEYN, DIANA POLSON & MICHAEL SPILLER, BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED
WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009),
available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1.
36. Id. at 56.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 16.

1078

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1069

worker participated in a face-to-face interview in his or her native language,
including English, Spanish, Polish, Russian, Chinese, French, Urdu, Hindi, and
Korean.39
Many of these workers would not be reached via traditional survey methods, as
they might not appear on voter registration rolls or other official lists from which
survey respondents are typically drawn or, due to their immigration status, might be
unwilling to give personal information to a stranger survey-taker. Thus, a typically
drawn random sample could exclude or undersample these workers, making it
extremely difficult to infer anything about their characteristics or presence in the
general population. As a result, the survey team employed a sampling methodology
known as respondent-driven sampling (RDS).40 First pioneered in public health
research, RDS uses survey respondents’ own social networks to allow researchers
to gain access to “hidden” or hard-to-reach groups.41 RDS methodology solves the
problems of lack of access and mistrust by relying on each early respondent to
recruit additional later respondents. In an RDS survey, each initial “seed” receives a
limited number of coded coupons to distribute to other people in her social

39. Id. at 13–14.
40. For more on RDS methodology, see Douglas D. Heckathorn, Extensions of
Respondent-Driven Sampling: Analyzing Continuous Variables and Controlling for
Differential Recruitment, 37 SOC. METHODOLOGY 151 (2007); Douglas D. Heckathorn,
Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New Approach to the Study of Hidden Populations, 44 SOC.
PROBS. 174 (1997) [hereinafter New Approach]; Douglas D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven
Sampling II: Deriving Valid Population Estimates from Chain-Referral Samples of Hidden
Populations, 49 SOC. PROBS. 11 (2002) [hereinafter Chain-Referral]; Matthew J. Salganik &
Douglas D. Heckathorn, Sampling and Estimation in Hidden Populations Using RespondentDriven Sampling, 34 SOC. METHODOLOGY 193 (2004); Matthew J. Salganik, Variance
Estimation, Design Effects, and Sample Size Calculations for Respondent-Driven Sampling,
83 J. URB. HEALTH 98 (2006); Erik Volz & Douglas D. Heckathorn, Probability Based
Estimation Theory for Respondent Driven Sampling, 24 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 79 (2008). The
above sources were all cited with approval in Michael W. Spiller, Annette Bernhardt, Jason
Perelshteyn & Douglas Heckathorn, Technical Report: Sampling, Fielding, and Estimation
in the 2008 Unregulated Work Survey (Ctr. for the Study of Econ. & Soc’y Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 62, 2010), available at http://www.economyandsociety.org/wp
-content/uploads/2013/08/wp62_SpillerHeckathornetal_Sampling.pdf.
41. More specifically, some populations may be too socially stigmatized to self-identify
as members of the relevant group, some may live in socially insular communities that are not
readily accessible to researchers, and some may be members of groups that are simply too
small to be captured in a typical randomly drawn sample from the U.S. population as a
whole. See, e.g., Douglas D. Heckathorn & Joan Jeffri, Finding the Beat: Using RespondentDriven Sampling to Study Jazz Musicians, 28 POETICS 307, 308 (2001) (defining jazz
musicians as a “hidden population” in that “(1) no sampling frame exists, so the size and
boundaries of the population are unknown, (2) there are strong privacy concerns, not because
of illegal or stigmatized behavior, but because of the tight but informal networks which
outsiders find hard to penetrate, and (3) the population constitutes a small proportion of the
general population”); Heckathorn, New Approach, supra note 40, at 174 (“‘Hidden
populations’ have two characteristics: first, no sampling frame exists, so the size and
boundaries of the population are unknown; and second, there exist strong privacy concerns,
because membership involves stigmatized or illegal behavior, leading individuals to refuse to
cooperate, or give unreliable answers to protect their privacy.”).

2014]

BOTTOM-UP WORKPLACE LAW ENFORCEMENT

1079

network.42 “Seeds” are compensated for their participation in the survey, as well as
for each additional respondent they successfully recruit. They vouch for the
integrity of the survey process, solving the trust problem, and they provide
researchers with an entrée to hidden communities of respondents, solving the
access problem.
Though RDS allows researchers to reach respondents who would likely be
missed by traditional survey methods, it creates problems of its own by generating
a nonrandom sample of the population. Each respondent’s participation is not
determined by chance, but instead by whether she is connected socially to a “seed.”
Because randomness is the foundational assumption upon which all of statistical
inference is built, RDS must compensate for the nonrandom nature of the samples
that its network-recruitment method generates. RDS does so by weighting each
response by the size and homophily, or sameness, of that respondent’s social
network.43 (Researchers determine size and homophily by asking a series of
carefully designed questions of each respondent.)44 Weighting produces an estimate
of the prevalence of the particular variable of interest in the general population,
known as the “population estimate,” within an RDS-specified confidence interval.45
In other words, it allows the characteristics and experiences of the respondents who
were surveyed to be generalized, roughly, to the three cities’ entire population of
low-wage, front-line workers—here, approximately 1.64 million total workers.46
Though RDS-like “snowball” or chain-referral survey methodologies have
existed for years, this weighting procedure represents an innovation, allowing
researchers to reliably account for the nonrandomness of respondents’ inclusion in
the sample. RDS methods remain an active area of research in statistics and survey
design, but the methodology is generally accepted as valid and is in wide use,
particularly within the fields of sociology and public health.47

42. Spiller et al., supra note 40, at 4 (“Our RDS survey began with an initial set of
population members to be surveyed, which we located through our contacts in each city.
These ‘seeds’ were then given a fixed number of uniquely numbered dollar-bill sized
coupons to pass on to other eligible population members.”).
43. See Chain-Referral, supra note 40, at 13, 20 (discussing the nonrandom nature of
RDS referrals and the resulting introduction of “homophily bias” and overrepresentation of
respondents with larger social networks).
44. A list of survey questions regarding respondents’ social networks appears in
Appendix A. Researchers also map respondents’ social networks by tracking coupon codes
and charting the links between seeds and recruited respondents. Researchers are then able to
gauge the level of homophily of each social network along a variety of axes to determine
whether, for example, female seeds recruited exclusively female respondents and Latino/a or
Hispanic seeds recruited exclusively Latino/a or Hispanic respondents.
45. See Chain-Referral, supra note 40, at 14 (discussing computation of population
estimates and standard errors).
46. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 35, at 2.
47. See, e.g., Matthew J. Salganik, Respondent-Driven Sampling in the Real World, 23
EPIDEMIOLOGY 148 (2012) (discussing widespread use of RDS and ongoing refinements of
RDS analytical techniques).
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B. Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the number and percentage of survey respondents by a variety of
demographic and job characteristic variables. The term “high road,” which appears
in Table 1 and throughout this Article, is used by labor economists to designate
employers that provide some fringe benefits and pay their employees more than the
required minimum:
It is commonly posited that employers face the choice of either
competing on the basis of cost or competing on the basis of quality,
variety, and service. In popular discussion, the former is referred to as
the “low road” and the latter as the “high road,” on the assumption that
the latter implies more generous employment conditions (such as
wages) and new work systems.48
The original survey team designated a “high-road” employer as one that provided
two or more of the following: health insurance, paid vacation days, paid sick days,
and pay raises to employees. In this data set, the “high-road” designation was not
particularly correlated with employer size. Employers with fewer than one hundred
employees were roughly as likely as employers with more than one hundred
employees to offer “high-road” benefits.
Table 1. Characteristics of Survey Respondents
Variable

Frequency (Percent)

City
Chicago
Los Angeles
New York

1097 (26%)
1772 (42%)
1391 (33%)

Gender
Female
Male

2250 (53%)
2009 (47%)

Race/Ethnicity
Latino/a or Hispanic
Black or African American
Asian or other race
White

2506 (59%)
919 (22%)
614 (14%)
214 (5%)

Age
46+ years
36–45 years
26–35 years
18–25 years

1258 (30%)
1071 (26%)
1036 (25%)
785 (19%)

48. Paul Osterman, How Common Is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts It?, 47
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 173, 179 (1994) (citations omitted); see generally ARNE L.
KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S TO 2000S (2013) (describing the rise of precarious
labor and the growing gap in job quality between high-wage and low-wage work).
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable

Frequency (Percent)

Education
Less than high school degree, no GED
High school degree or GED
Some college or associate’s degree
College or higher degree

1715 (40%)
1385 (33%)
819 (19%)
326 (8%)

Nativity and immigration status
U.S.-born citizen
Undocumented resident
Foreign-born citizen
Documented resident

1506 (36%)
1445 (34%)
518 (12%)
757 (18%)

Union membership
Not a union member
Union member

3911 (92%)
330 (8%)

Occupation during previous workweek49
Service occupations
Production, transportation, and material
Sales and office occupations
Construction, extraction, and maintenance
Management, professional, and related

2156 (51%)
944 (22%)
760 (18%)
333 (8%)
66 (2%)

Industry during previous workweek50
Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodations, and food
services
Other services (except public administration)
Retail trade
Nondurable goods manufacturing
Educational, health, and social services
Professional, scientific, and management
Construction
Transportation and warehousing
Finance, insurance, real estate, and rental and leasing
Durable goods manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Public administration
Information and communications

833 (20%)
746 (18%)
662 (16%)
605 (14%)
431 (10%)
411 (10%)
267 (6%)
201 (5%)
58 (1%)
32 (1%)
6 (0%)
4 (0%)
3 (0%)

49. Occupation categories are those used by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of
Labor Statistics. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DOL, 2010 CENSUS OCCUPATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cenocc.pdf.
50. Industry categories are those used by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of
Labor Statistics. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DOL, 2007 CENSUS INDUSTRIAL
CLASSIFICATION (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cenind.pdf.
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable

Frequency (Percent)

Job tenure
0–5 years
6–10 years
11–15 years
16–20 years

3675 (87%)
372 (9%)
130 (3%)
29 (1%)

Employer size
Under 100 employees
100 employees or more

2371 (62%)
1484 (38%)

“High-road” employer
0–1 “high-road” indicators
2+ “high-road” indicators

2967 (69%)
1233 (31%)

(N = 4387)

C. Our Analysis
The original survey team’s 2009 Broken Laws report focused primarily on
unpaid wages and health and safety violations experienced by low-wage, front-line
workers.51 Though the report also presented figures on the prevalence of retaliation
and workers who chose not to make claims about workplace problems (variables of
interest here), it did so only descriptively, without the regressions included in our
analysis that allow study of the characteristics of workers who made different
claiming choices.52 Nor did the report investigate our other variables of interest: the
level of workers’ substantive and procedural legal knowledge and the factors
associated with workers’ being more or less informed about their rights.
Drawing on the raw survey data, our analysis focuses on five main variables: (1)
workplace problems, or the frequency with which workers reported experiencing
problems on the job (the “naming” of problems); (2) claims, or the frequency with
which workers engaged in claiming behavior after identifying a workplace
problem; (3) retaliation, or the prevalence of retaliation against workers who made
claims about justiciable problems; (4) substantive legal knowledge, or the extent to
which workers knew their minimum wage and overtime rights;53 and (5) procedural
legal knowledge, or the extent to which workers knew how to make a government
complaint about a workplace problem.54

51. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 35, at 2 (“This report exposes a world of work in
which the core protections that many Americans take for granted—the right to be paid at
least the minimum wage, the right to be paid for overtime hours, the right to take meal
breaks, access to workers’ compensation when injured, and the right to advocate for better
working conditions—are failing significant numbers of workers.”).
52. Id. at 24–25.
53. The original survey asked only about workers’ knowledge of minimum wage and
overtime law and not about their knowledge of other types of workplace rights. Relevant
survey questions are reproduced in Appendix A.
54. The original survey asked only whether workers knew where to file a government
complaint and not how to engage in other methods of formal claiming such as contacting an
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Using the RDS network-size weighting process, we first generated population
point estimates and confidence intervals for the five main variables.55 This allowed
us to calculate the percentage (within a given margin of error) of the three cities’
low-wage, front-line workforce that fell into each of the five main variable
categories, that is, the approximate percentage of workers who had identified
workplace problems, made claims, experienced retaliation, and had accurate
substantive and procedural legal knowledge. We also generated RDS estimates for
two additional variables: (1) the reasons workers gave for their decisions not to
make claims; and (2) for those who did make claims, the method(s) and subject(s)
of those claims.56
Next, we explored which groups of workers were more or less likely to identify
problems, make claims, experience retaliation, and have accurate substantive and
procedural legal knowledge. Using logistic regression, we modeled the associations
between these dependent variables and a number of independent variables,
including worker demographics and job characteristics.57 Though logistic
regression does not allow us to identify causal relationships, it does enable us to
identify whether workers with certain characteristics—for example, women or
undocumented workers—were more or less likely, holding all else constant, to

attorney, union representative, or other third party. Relevant survey questions are reproduced
in Appendix A.
55. We used the Respondent Driven Sampling Analysis Tool software (RDSAT),
available at http://www.respondentdrivensampling.org, to produce RDS population point
estimates and confidence intervals.
56. We report these results in Part III and Table 7 in Appendix B.
57. We used Stata to run all regressions. We chose to use a logit model because our
dependent variables are binary, that is, they have two values (0, 1). To test model fit, we
used a nonlinear version of the Hausman test (a combination of the suest and testn1
commands in Stata) to compare the logit and ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients. The
null hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients from both estimators are not significantly
different from each other so the OLS estimator is consistent and efficient, versus an
alternative hypothesis that the coefficients from both estimators are significantly different
from each other so the OLS estimator would be inconsistent. The test results for our
regressions led us to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that logit is the better model. In
addition, we used probability weights provided by the original survey team in estimating the
logistic regression equations to correct for the sample bias introduced by the RDS sampling
methodology. These weights also took into account the undersampling of certain
races/ethnicities among survey respondents. For a further explanation of the weighting
process, see Spiller et al., supra note 40, at 13. Finally, following the protocol recommended
by the original survey team, we dropped from our analysis all respondents identified as home
health workers, due to changing coverage of this occupational category under federal and
state wage and hour law. For other uses and explanations of logistic regression methods and
interpretation, see James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility
Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1694–1713 (1999) (using logistic regression to model the effect of a
variety of independent variables on judicial voting in cases involving unions); Cass R.
Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 316 (2004) (using logistic
regression to investigate the relationship between a judge’s ideology and voting patterns).
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identify problems, make claims, experience retaliation, or have accurate substantive
and procedural legal knowledge.58
A preliminary note is warranted on possible limitations of the survey data. First,
the survey was not designed primarily to investigate questions of problem
identification, claiming behavior, retaliation, and legal knowledge. Though the
particular survey questions analyzed in this Article do address those topics, they
contain some gaps. For example, the questions concerning workers’ substantive
legal knowledge asked only about knowledge of minimum wage and overtime
rights, and not about other areas of employment and labor law, and the questions
concerning procedural legal knowledge inquired only about claims made to a
government agency, and not about claims made via litigation. As a result, the
conclusions drawn in this Article are necessarily limited.
Second, the data are now relatively old, as they were collected in 2008, five
years before the time of this writing. However, 2008 came after the onset of the
Great Recession, the effects of which low-wage, front-line workers continue to
feel.59 To the extent that depressed economic conditions have an impact on
workers’ claiming behavior, conditions are still relatively depressed, and
readministering the survey today would likely produce substantially similar
results.60 In fact, some commentators have observed that conditions for low-wage,
front-line workers have worsened since 2008, as employers increasingly use
temporary, part-time, and other contingent work arrangements, and union density
continues to decline.61
Third, one could argue that selection effects may be present among the
respondents who chose to participate in the survey. Only the more assertive
workers would choose to be surveyed, the argument goes, and those more assertive
workers might also be more likely to have made claims on the job. However, as
noted in Part III, only about 57% of workers made any claim at all in the twelve
months before the survey. If this figure represents only assertive, claim-prone
workers, then the real incidence of claiming behavior was even lower, further
emphasizing the problems with a claims-driven, bottom-up workplace law
enforcement regime.

58. Part III and Tables 8–12 in Appendix C present the results of our logistic regression
models.
59. See, e.g., Long-Term Unemployment: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions:
Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 111th Cong. 35, 36 (2010) (statement of Lawrence
F. Katz, Professor, Harvard University) (testifying about lingering “labor market distress”
well into 2010).
60. See Willborn, supra note 10, at 8 (postulating that “[e]conomic downturns may . . .
affect discovery of violations through private enforcement”).
61. PAMELA LOPREST & AUSTIN NICHOLS, UNEMPLOYMENT & RECOVERY PROJECT,
URBAN INST., LESS-EDUCATED CONTINUE TO LOSE JOBS IN RECOVERY—EVEN IN LOW-WAGE
INDUSTRIES (2011), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?id=412382&RSSFeed
=UI_PovertyandSafetyNet.xml (“[S]ince the end of the recession, low-skill workers continue
to be the biggest net job losers across industries.”); WEIL, supra note 3, at 9–11 (discussing
the breakup, or “fissuring,” of the traditional employment relationship, declining
unionization rates, and other factors contributing to the degradation of conditions for lowwage, front-line workers).
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III. RESULTS
This Part, along with the tables in Appendices B and C,62 reports the results of
our analysis of the survey data. The subsequent Part discusses possible
explanations for our findings and considers the implications for bottom-up
workplace law enforcement.
A. Workplace Problems
About one-third of low-wage, front-line workers identified a problem on the job
in the twelve months before the survey.63 In Felstiner’s terms, these are the workers
who perceived, or “named” problems. However, the occurrence of actual
workplace problems was probably much higher. The original survey team gathered
respondents’ raw wage and hour data and determined that 26% of workers had been
paid less than the minimum wage during the previous workweek and 76% who had
worked more than forty hours had not been paid proper overtime.64 Thirty percent
of tipped workers had not been paid lawfully, and 70% of workers who had worked
beyond their scheduled shift were not paid for this extra working time.65 These
calculations focus only on violations of wage and hour laws; occurrences of actual
workplace problems may have been higher if other rights violations were also
considered.66

62. Table 7 in Appendix B reports the RDS population point estimates and confidence
intervals for the five main variables (workplace problems, claims, retaliation, substantive
legal knowledge, and procedural legal knowledge), along with the reasons workers gave for
their decisions not to make claims, and, for those who did engage in claims making, the
method(s) and subject(s) of their claims. Tables 8–12 in Appendix C show the full results of
our logistic regression equations for the workplace problems, claims, retaliation, and
substantive and procedural legal knowledge variables.
63. The original survey did not ask respondents directly about workplace problem
identification. As a result, we calculated the rate of problem identification by adding together
the workers who had made a claim about a problem with the workers who had identified a
problem but did not make a claim. See infra Appendix A (reproducing two separate survey
questions).
64. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 35, at 2–3.
65. Id.
66. For example, surveys of almost five hundred low-wage workers in the San
Francisco, California, area conducted by sociologist Shannon Gleeson revealed that:
Almost all claimants had had a rest or meal break denied or shortened
throughout their working life, and half reported problems with timely payment.
Over a third had been denied time off for illness and half had been become
injured or ill because of their job. Verbal abuse or degrading treatment had at
some point been present for two-thirds of the sample, and over a quarter of all
women reported being sexually harassed at some point.
Shannon Gleeson, The Limits to Lawyering: Findings from a Survey of Low-Wage Workers
in the San Francisco Bay Area, Remarks at the Labor and Global Solidarity, American
Sociological Association Labor & Labor Movements Section Mini-Conference (Aug. 12,
2013) (on file with author).
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The difference between the one-third of workers who identified workplace
problems and the higher rates of actual problems points to issues with “naming”:
workers were not “saying to [themselves] that a particular experience has been
injurious.”67 As explored further below, the discrepancy may also be explained by
workers’ lack of substantive legal knowledge, creating an inability to identify
justiciable problems and an underreporting of problems at work.68
Table 2 lists the characteristics of the workers who were more and less likely to
identify workplace problems, all else equal. This and subsequent tables in this Part
list only the regression results that are statistically significant and that likely can be
explained by an actual association between the independent variables (worker
characteristics) and dependent variable (workplace problems) rather than by
chance. These results are indicated by asterisks. The table also lists results that are
just outside the bounds of significance, but appear to be intuitively correct,
indicated by a dagger. Full regression results for workplace problems are reported
in Table 8 in Appendix C.69
The regression results summarized throughout this Part should be interpreted
differently depending on the type of independent variable at issue. For independent
variables such as gender that have a discrete set of values (female and male), each
value that was included in the regression model is compared to its counterpart that
was not in the regression. These comparison values are known as the “base
category,” and are listed for each regression in Tables 8–12 in Appendix C. For
example, in Table 2, the variable “female” is included in the model, while “male” is
in the base category. Table 2 shows that, holding all else constant, women workers
were less likely to have identified a workplace problem in the previous year than
male workers, the value in the base category. For continuous independent variables
such as age, the results reflect the impact on the dependent variable when the value
of the independent variable increases by one. Referring again to Table 2, for
example, each additional year of age reported made a respondent less likely to
identify a workplace problem.

67. Felstiner et al., supra note 24, at 635.
68. The discrepancy might also be explained by respondents’ reluctance to identify
workplace problems to survey takers, out of a fear that their complaints might somehow
reach their employers’ ears.
69. Throughout this Part, we have chosen only to examine the sign, or direction, of the
association between independent and dependent variables, rather than the relative strength of
that association. Though additional work could be done (using odds ratios or marginal
effects) to rank the relative impact of each independent variable on the dependent variables,
because many of our results lack statistical significance, we have chosen to restrict our
analysis to an examination of only the sign or direction of the coefficient and not its relative
magnitude.
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Table 2. Workplace Problems
Less likely to identify workplace problem

More likely to identify workplace problem

•

Female**

•

Education***

•

Age***

•

Does not know where to file
government complaint (procedural
legal knowledge)**

•

Employer is not “high road”***

•

Not a union member

•

Job tenure of fewer than 12 months*

•

Employer has fewer than 100
employees**

†

(N = 3620)
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15

As Table 2 shows, women, nonunion members, workers who had job tenure of
less than one year, and workers at employers with fewer than 100 employees were
all less likely than their counterparts in the base category to have identified a
problem at work in the previous twelve months. In addition, for every year of age a
respondent reported, she was less likely to have identified a workplace problem.
The results with respect to gender, union membership, and increasing age appear
generally to follow from theory. Women, nonunion members, and older workers,
who tend to hold less powerful positions in the workplace and society as a whole,
may be less accustomed to taking the relatively transgressive step of “naming”
workplace problems, to “saying to [themselves] that a particular experience has
been injurious.”70 These groups of workers may also have less legal knowledge
than other worker groups to enable them to identify problems at work. For
example, Table 5, infra, reports that each increasing year of a respondent’s age was
associated with a lower chance that a worker knew her minimum wage and
overtime rights. In addition, labor unions may serve an educational or
consciousness-raising function, enabling their members to engage in more
“naming” of workplace problems than their nonunion counterparts.71 Social science
research has also shown that women in particular may be reluctant to “name”
workplace problems as such, “to perceive themselves as targets of discrimination
[including sexual harassment], notwithstanding evidence” that these workplace
problems have occurred.72 Researchers posit that this may be a self-esteem
preservation strategy: if women workers’ failings are the result of personal
deficiencies, rather than their gender, their self-esteem may suffer in the
“performance domain,” but may be intact with respect to their standing in society
as a whole.73 Such a dynamic may be at play in the results reported in Table 2,
where women workers were less likely than men to “name” workplace problems.

70. Felstiner et al., supra note 24, at 635.
71. The results reported in Table 5, infra, complicate this narrative somewhat.
72. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 26 (2005) (collecting social
science research).
73. Id. at 26–27.
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With respect to job tenure, this result may merely be a consequence of exposure:
workers who had been employed for less than a full year may have had fewer
opportunities to experience, and to identify, a problem on the job during that year.
Alternatively, workers with shorter job tenures may have had less experience in the
workplace generally and be less aware of and able to identify workplace problems
when they occurred.
Finally, the positive association between a lower likelihood of naming
workplace problems and a worker’s employment at a relatively small employer
(fewer than 100 employees) could be interpreted in multiple ways. On the one
hand, there may be fewer workplace problems to identify in the first place at
smaller employers, because those workforces may be closer-knit and better at
avoiding workplace conflict than larger ones.74 On the other hand, the rate of
underlying workplace problems may be the same at smaller and larger employers,
but workers at smaller employers may be less likely to identify those problems
because of a greater sense of loyalty generated by small workplace size, or because
smaller “mom and pop” employers may tend to hire workers who are a priori less
educated and assertive than workers employed at larger, more sophisticated
operations.75
Table 2 also shows that every year of education reported by a worker made it
more likely that she had identified a workplace problem in the previous twelve
months. Workers who did not know where to file a government complaint and
those employed by “low-road” employers were also more likely to have identified
problems on the job. The education result makes sense: as education levels
increase, one would expect workers to be aware of their legal rights and norms of
fair treatment on the job, and to “name” violations of those rights and norms as
they occur. The result with respect to workers employed by low-road employers is
also intuitive: employers that do not provide health insurance, paid sick and
vacation leave, and pay raises may generate more dissatisfaction in the workplace,
and their workers may be more likely to identify workplace problems.
The result with respect to lack of procedural legal knowledge is harder to
explain, as one might expect that workers who did not know where to file a
government complaint would be less likely to have identified a workplace problem

74. See, e.g., Harry Matlay, Employee Relations in Small Firms: A Micro-Business
Perspective, 21 EMP. REL. 285, 292 (1999) (describing the results of a study of
approximately 6000 small businesses in the United Kingdom; finding that “[t]he deliberate
informality inherent in the majority of [small business] owner/managers’ styles seems to
have facilitated a personal approach that, in most cases, resulted in amicable solutions to
complex and occasionally acrimonious work-related situations”).
75. See, e.g., Marilyn Carroll, Mick Marchington, Jill Earnshaw & Stephen Taylor,
Recruitment in Small Firms: Processes, Methods and Problems, 21 EMP. REL. 236, 238
(1999) (describing results of a study of forty small firms in the United Kingdom; reporting
complaints from small firms about “the quality of labour available, including a lack of basic
literacy skills, particularly among young people”); George Saridakis, Rebeca Muñoz Torres
& Stewart Johnstone., Do Human Resource Practices Enhance Organizational Commitment
in SMEs with Low Employee Satisfaction?, 24 BRIT. J. MGMT. 445, 452 (2013) (finding in
analysis of nationwide survey of British firms that “employees in small organizations are
more committed [to their organizations] than their counterparts in large firms”).
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in the previous twelve months. However, this result may in fact signal the
importance of a worker’s having both substantive and procedural legal knowledge
in order to progress up the dispute identification and resolution pyramid. Without
knowledge of her substantive legal rights in the workplace, procedural legal
knowledge alone—knowing where or how to file a workplace complaint with the
government—may not help a worker take the initial step of “saying to [herself] that
a particular experience has been injurious.”76
B. Claims
Of the workers who had identified a workplace problem within the year prior to
the survey, about 57% decided to make a claim of some type.77 Almost all of these
workers (96%) chose to make a claim to their employer, while very few
complained directly to a government agency or to an intermediary such as an
attorney or union representative. Sixty-five percent of workers’ claims were about
justiciable workplace problems, that is, violations of workers’ legal rights around
pay, discrimination, harassment, abuse, or occupational safety. The remaining
claims were nonjusticiable, centering on quality of worklife (e.g. commute time,
workload, and work schedule) and benefits. Of all workers who had identified a
workplace problem, then, approximately 37% made a claim about a justiciable
problem, 20% made a nonjusticiable claim, and 43% made no claim at all.
Of the 43% of workers who decided not to make a claim about an identified
workplace problem, the top two reasons workers gave for their decision were a fear
of being fired and a belief that the claim would make no difference.78 The next two
reasons (apart from “other”) were also retaliation related: the worker’s fear of
having her wages or hours cut and the worker’s knowledge of retaliation against
others for claiming behavior. The next reason points to a lack of procedural legal
knowledge: uncertainty as to how to make a claim.
Table 3 lists the worker characteristics that were associated with a greater or
lesser likelihood of claims making.79

76. Felstiner et al., supra note 24, at 635.
77. Appendix A reproduces the relevant survey questions. Here, workers were asked,
“During the last 12 months, did you make a complaint, either by yourself or with coworkers, about your working conditions, by going to your employer, supervisor or going to a
government agency?”
78. Workers were asked, “During the past 12 months, were there times when you DID
NOT complain, even though you had a problem at your job with dangerous working
conditions, discrimination, not being paid the minimum wage or not being paid overtime?”
and “What stopped you from complaining?” The menu of choices is listed in Appendix A.
79. Full regression results for the claims model are reported in Table 9 in Appendix C.
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Table 3. Claims
Less likely to make claim

More likely to make claim

•

Does not know minimum wage and overtime rights
(substantive legal knowledge)*

•

•

Does not know where to file a government
complaint (procedural legal knowledge)**

•

Employer is not “high road”*

•

Not a union member†

•

Age†

•

Job tenure of fewer than 12 months***

•

Asian or other race†

No results

(N = 1422)
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15

The regression results summarized in Table 3 suggest that workers without
substantive and procedural legal knowledge, as well as workers who were not
union members or who worked for a low-road employer, were less likely to make
claims about a workplace problem than their counterparts in the base category. In
addition, for each additional year of age reported by a worker, the likelihood that
she had made a claim in the twelve months before the survey decreased. Finally,
workers who had been employed for fewer than twelve months were less likely to
have made a claim during that time, as were workers who identified as “Asian or
other race.”80
These results are, on the whole, as one might expect: less powerful and
economically stable workers appear less likely to engage in claiming behavior than
their more powerful and stable coworkers. For example, claims may be riskier for
older than younger workers, because if an older worker is fired in retaliation,
finding a replacement job may be relatively more difficult.81 Likewise, nonunion
members might be expected to make claims less frequently than their unionized
counterparts, as they have less support and fewer channels through which to air
their grievances.
In addition, workers who were employed by low-road employers were less
likely to make claims than their counterparts in the base category. At first glance,

80. “Other races” include any worker who did not identify as “White,” “Black or
African American,” or “Latino/a or Hispanic.”
81. See, e.g., Sewin Chan & Ann Huff Stevens, Job Loss and Employment Patterns of
Older Workers, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 484, 485 (2001) (finding that employment rates of workers
aged 50 and older “are substantially below the employment rates of comparably aged
nondisplaced workers” and that “a job loss at age 50 or above has substantial and longlasting employment effects”). Older workers may also have more dependents to support than
younger workers, increasing the harm caused by a retaliatory job loss and making those
workers more reluctant to risk retaliation by making claims.
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this result may seem counterintuitive: workers at low-road companies would
presumably have more to complain about than their counterparts who receive
benefits and pay raises. However, low-road employers may hire a less empowered
workforce to begin with, or might send signals, either explicitly or implicitly by
providing substandard wages and working conditions, that worker claims would be
futile.
It is also unsurprising that workers who did not know their substantive legal
rights or how to make a government complaint were less likely to make claims than
workers who did have this knowledge. This result squares with the self-reported
reasons, discussed above, that workers gave for choosing not to make claims after
identifying workplace problems: a top explanation given was that workers did not
know how to make a claim.
Workers who had held their job for fewer than twelve months were also less
likely to have made a claim about a workplace problem during that time. This may
simply reflect the opportunity (or lack thereof) to experience a problem: the longer
a worker remains on the job, the more potential exposure she has to workplace
problems and the more chances she has to make claims. In addition, the more
experience a worker accrues at a job, the more valued she may feel at the company
and the more secure she may feel in engaging in claiming behavior.
Finally, it is difficult to explain why workers who identified as “Asian or other
race” were less likely to make claims than other workers who identified as “White,”
“Black or African American,” or “Latino/a or Hispanic.” As Tables 5 and 6 show,
workers who identified as “Asian or other race” were less likely than members of
other racial and ethnic groups to have accurate substantive and procedural legal
knowledge. This lack of legal knowledge—itself an interesting result—probably
contributed to these workers’ lower likelihood of engaging in claiming behavior.
C. Retaliation
Of the workers who had made claims about justiciable problems in the twelve
months before the survey, about 43% experienced some form of employer reprisal
in response to their most recent complaint.82 Of these reprisals, roughly 35%
constituted unlawful retaliation in violation of labor and employment laws,
including termination or suspension, calls to the police or immigration, decreases in
hours, and abuse and harassment.83 The remaining reprisals were acts such as
threats that likely did not rise to the level of an “adverse employment action,” a
requirement for retaliation to be unlawful,84 but nevertheless likely had a silencing
effect on workers.

82. Workers were asked, “Did your employer or supervisor know you made this
complaint?” and “Did your employer or supervisor do any of the following as a direct result
of this complaint?” The menu of choices is listed in Appendix A.
83. To identify unlawful retaliation, the original survey team analyzed respondents’
descriptions of the reprisals they experienced and counted only those acts that would be
actionable under the relevant labor and employment laws. Spiller et al., supra note 40, at 25–
26 (describing criteria used).
84. Jennifer Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53
BAYLOR L. REV. 535 (2001) (discussing adverse employment action requirement for FLSA
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Apart from those workers who experienced some form of retaliation,
approximately 15% of workers reported that their employers addressed or promised
to address the workers’ claims. The remaining workers’ employers took no action,
ignored the workers’ claims, or engaged in some other response.
Thus, in sum, of all workers who had made claims about justiciable workplace
problems, about 15% experienced unlawful retaliation, 28% experienced some
other form of reprisal, another 15% had their claims addressed or promised to be
addressed, and 42% were met with employer inaction or some other response.
Table 4 lists the variables that were associated with higher and lower risks of
employer retaliation of all types, not just reprisals that would constitute violations
of the law. Full regression results on retaliation are reported in Table 10 in
Appendix C.
Table 4. Retaliation
Less likely to experience retaliation

More likely to experience retaliation

•

•

Made claim alone*

No results

(N = 560)
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15

As Table 4 shows, we achieved only one statistically significant result with
respect to retaliation. We suspect that a smaller number of observations (560 as
opposed to between 1422 and 3620 for the other dependent variables) may be
driving this outcome. It also may be explained by the very nature of retaliation.
Individual-level worker characteristics such as gender and race/ethnicity may not
be associated strongly with the experience of reprisals because an employer’s
retaliatory threats or acts may be directed toward the workforce generally, as
opposed to singling out a particular worker or workers.85 For example, an employer
may gather the entire low-wage, front-line workforce and threaten them about the
negative consequences of claiming behavior.86 Such threats may have a silencing
effect across the workforce, without regard to individual worker characteristics, and
may therefore not register in the regression analyses performed in this Part.
Turning to the one result in Table 4, workers who made claims alone were less
likely to experience retaliation of any type than those who complained in a group.
This may seem counterintuitive, as individual claimants would appear to be weaker
and more vulnerable to being “picked off” by employer retaliation. However,
employers may perceive claims brought by groups of workers as more threatening
than those brought by individuals, and therefore be more likely to engage in
reprisals against group rather than individual claimants.

retaliation cases); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment
Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What
Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623 (2003) (same for Title VII).
85. Thanks to Pauline Kim for this insight.
86. See, e.g., infra Part V.A (recounting a circumstance in which an entire workforce
was likely silenced by an employer’s threats).
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D. Substantive Legal Knowledge
Approximately 41% of workers had accurate substantive legal knowledge in the
area of wage and hour law, meaning that 59% misunderstood their minimum wage
and overtime rights.87 With respect to the minimum wage, workers were asked to
name the current applicable minimum wage in their city, and the original survey
team checked the responses for accuracy based on the federal, state, and local laws
in place at the time. Workers over- and underestimated the required minimum wage
in about equal numbers: 25% gave a number below the required minimum, while
21% gave a number above.
Table 5 lists the variables that were associated with a greater or lesser likelihood
of a worker’s knowing her minimum wage and overtime rights. Full substantive
legal knowledge regression results are reported in Table 11 in Appendix C.
Table 5. Substantive Legal Knowledge
Less likely to know minimum wage and
overtime rights
•

Employer has fewer than 100
employees***

•

Age***

•

Black or African American***

•

White***

•

Asian or other race†

More likely to know minimum wage and
overtime rights
•

Not a union member*

•

No legal immigration status†

(N = 3620)
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15

Here, workers who worked for relatively small employers (those with 100 or
fewer employees) were less likely than employees of larger companies to know
their minimum wage and overtime rights. As workers reported higher ages, the
likelihood that they had accurate substantive legal knowledge also fell. In addition,
workers who identified as “Black or African American,” “White,” or “Asian or
other race” were less likely to know their minimum wage and overtime rights than
those who identified as Latino/a or Hispanic. On the other hand, workers who were
not union members and who had no legal immigration status (i.e. were
undocumented workers) were more likely to report accurate knowledge of their
wage and hour rights.
The result with respect to employer size is relatively intuitive: smaller
companies that lack human resources departments or formal employee screening

87. Workers were asked, “As far as you know, what is the current minimum wage in
[CITY]?” and “As far as you know, do employers have to pay workers more than their usual
wage when they work more than 40 hours in a week?” See infra Appendix A.
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procedures may hire a less sophisticated workforce with lower levels of legal
knowledge. Alternatively, smaller companies may do a worse job than larger
companies of educating their employees about workplace laws through training and
compliance programs.88
With respect to age, older workers may be at a disadvantage in knowing their
minimum wage rights because the minimum wage changes over time. For example,
the oldest respondent was eighty-one years old at the time of the survey. Since his
or her eighteenth birthday in 1945, federal minimum wage laws have changed
twenty-six times, California’s state minimum wage law has changed at least eleven
times, Illinois’ at least fourteen times, and New York’s at least sixteen times.89 A
worker may learn the minimum wage when she enters the workforce and may
update that knowledge periodically, but may not always have accurate, current
minimum wage information for her locality.
Turning to the race and ethnicity results, it is unclear why members of certain
races or ethnicities would be less likely to have substantive legal knowledge than
members of other races. Here, “Latino/a or Hispanic” is the variable in the base
category; workers who identified as every other race/ethnicity were less likely than
Latino/a or Hispanic workers to know their minimum wage and overtime rights.
This may be because Latino/a or Hispanic workers are generally overrepresented in
the type of low-wage, front-line jobs targeted by this survey.90 Latino/a workers
may therefore have stronger networks on the job than other workers and be more
likely to educate one another about their wage and hour rights. Precisely because of
that overrepresentation, these workers may also be the recipients of targeted
know-your-rights campaigns and outreach efforts by advocacy groups, designed to
inform Latino/a workers of their substantive legal rights.91
Finally, the two variables associated with a greater likelihood of a worker’s
knowing her substantive minimum wage and overtime rights, “not a union
member” and “no legal immigration status,” appear initially to be counterintuitive.
However, it may be that workers who are union members tend to earn relatively

88. For example, research conducted in the United Kingdom has shown that employer
size was correlated with legal knowledge: smaller firms were “less likely to be
knowledgeable about employment rights.” ROBERT BLACKBURN & MARK HART, SMALL
FIRMS’ AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS (Small Business
Research Centre, Kingston Univ., Employment Relations Research Series No. 14) 70–71
(2002).
89. See Wage & Hour Div., Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-Farm
Employment Under State Law: Selected Years 1968 to 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Apr.
2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm#.UNHUt3ek04U; Wage & Hour
Div., History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938–
2009, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm#.UM_ECqDyXRQ.
90. See, e.g., Janelle Jones & John Schmitt, Low-Wage Latino Workers, CENTER FOR
ECON. POL’Y & RES. (Apr. 4, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/cepr
-blog/low-wage-latino-workers (concluding that, given their overall presence in the
population, “Latinos are indeed over-represented among low-wage workers,” defined as
those who earn $10 per hour or less).
91. For example, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division runs a
campaign that specifically targets undocumented workers with wage and hour claims. Wage
& Hour Div., We Can Help, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/wecanhelp/.
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high wages under their particular collective bargaining agreements and are
therefore less informed about universally applicable minimum wage requirements
under the law.92 In addition, undocumented workers, who, like Latino/a and
Hispanic workers, hold a disproportionate number of low-wage, front-line jobs,93
may be the recipients of the same sort of targeted “know-your-rights” outreach
efforts by advocacy groups discussed above. Undocumented workers may also be
less complacent about knowing the law than their documented counterparts, as the
law shapes their existence to a great extent, with the risk of arrest, detention, and
deportation looming large in their working lives.94
E. Procedural Legal Knowledge
Approximately 23% of workers had accurate procedural legal knowledge; a
corresponding 77% did not know where to file a workplace complaint with the
government. Interestingly, even those workers who knew how to make a
government complaint were unlikely to act on that knowledge, as 96% of workers
who did make a claim on the job made it directly to their employers, rather than to
a government agency or other third party. Moreover, the 23% result may actually
be inflated, as a worker’s knowledge of government complaint procedures was
self-reported, with no way for researchers to test the accuracy of workers’
responses.95
Table 6 lists the variables that were associated with higher and lower likelihoods
of a worker’s knowing where to file a government complaint.96

92. Lawrence Mishel, Unions, Inequality, and Faltering Middle-Class Wages, 342
ECON. POL’Y INST. ISSUE BRIEFS 1 (2012) (reporting that workers covered by a union contract
earn 13.6% higher wages than those without a union contract).
93. RANDY CAPPS, MICHAEL FIX, JEFFREY S. PASSEL, JASON OST & DAN PEREZ-LOPEZ,
URBAN INST., BRIEF NO. 4, A PROFILE OF THE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE 1 (2003)
(finding that “[i]mmigrants compose an increasingly large share of the U.S. labor force and a
growing share of low-wage workers” and “[t]wo of every five low-wage immigrant workers
are undocumented”).
94. Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant
Status for Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 563 (2010) (contending
that, “like the holistic experiences of race, class, and gender,” “undocumented status is
similarly a master status that is constructed by the law and that in turn shapes an individual’s
relationship to the law” (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)).
95. Workers were asked, “Do you know where to file a complaint with the government
if you are having a problem with an employer?” See infra Appendix A.
96. Full procedural legal knowledge regression results are reported in Table 12 in
Appendix C.
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Table 6. Procedural Legal Knowledge
Less likely to know where to file
government complaint

More likely to know where to file
government complaint

•

Female***

•

Age***

•

No legal immigration status***

•

Education**

•

Employer is not “high road”***

•

Black or African American**

•

Asian or other race**

(N = 3606)
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15

As Table 6 shows, women, workers without legal immigration status, workers
employed by low-road employers, and those who identified as “Asian or other
race” were all less likely than those in the base category to know where to file a
workplace complaint with a government agency. On the other hand, increasing age,
education, and identification as “Black or African American” were associated with
a greater likelihood of a worker’s having accurate procedural legal knowledge.
These results generally follow from theory. Low-wage, front-line women, who
have lower social standing than their male counterparts, may have had less
exposure than men to information about government complaint procedures. And
undocumented workers, despite having relatively greater substantive legal
knowledge, might not know how to make a government complaint because of an
overarching view that government contact of any sort would risk detection and
deportation.97
The result regarding low-road employers is also consistent with intuition:
low-road employers may be less likely to educate their workers about government
complaint procedures, or may hire workers who are a priori less knowledgeable
about their procedural legal rights. In addition, workers who identified as “Asian or
other race” were less likely to have procedural legal knowledge. As with the results
in Tables 3 and 5, some cultural norm against claiming may be in effect, resulting
in workers who identify as “Asian or other race” being less likely to have legal
knowledge or engage in claiming behavior.
On the flip side, age, education, and identification as “Black or African
American” were positively associated with accurate procedural legal knowledge.
With respect to age, unlike the substantive wage and hour laws, channels for
government complaint tend not to change over time. One would therefore expect
procedural legal knowledge to increase as workers grow older and have more
exposure to workplace problems and channels for complaint. In addition, workers
with higher levels of education overall may know more about how to lodge a
government complaint than those with fewer years of schooling. Finally, workers’

97. See, e.g., Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV.
1089, 1101–03 (2011) (discussing unauthorized immigrants’ mistrust of even friendly or
status-neutral U.S. government institutions).
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identification as “Black or African American” may be positively correlated with
procedural legal knowledge because African Americans may have a comparatively
longer history of seeking government redress for legal wrongs than other racial or
ethnic groups.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTTOM-UP WORKPLACE LAW ENFORCEMENT
Taken together, the results reported in Part III suggest some conclusions about
the empirics of workplace dispute generation and resolution and the functioning of
our system of bottom-up workplace law enforcement. First, though our workplace
law enforcement regime is designed to identify, surface, and resolve justiciable
problems from the bottom up, some number of actual workplace rights violations
are never even identified, or “named,” by workers. This can be seen in Figure 2,
which synthesizes the findings reported in Part III and replicates a workplace
dispute pyramid, turned on its side.

Figure 2. Workplace problems, claims, and employer responses.
* Because of a small number of observations, RDSAT was not able to generate a population
point estimate for the 42% figure, which is therefore a very rough estimate.

As the left-most column shows, though the original survey team calculated rates
of actual wage and hour law violations of up to 76%, only about 33% of workers
“named” a workplace problem. This slippage between actual and perceived
workplace problems may be attributed to workers’ lack of substantive legal
knowledge: about 59% of workers did not know their minimum wage and overtime
rights. Moreover, as the workplace problem regression results in Table 2, supra,
reflect, less politically, socially, and economically powerful and secure workers—
women workers, older workers, nonunion workers—were less likely to engage in
the process of “naming” workplace problems. “Naming” therefore represents a
point where claims are escaping from the workplace dispute pyramid, confounding
the expectations of our bottom-up system of workplace law enforcement.

1098

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1069

Second, claiming is another point of escape from the pyramid. As the second
column in Figure 2 illustrates, about 33% of workers had identified workplace
problems, but 43% of those workers chose not to make claims. It is unknown from
these data whether workers chose silent loyalty or exit instead of voice. However,
median job tenure among survey respondents was 2.25 years,98 about half the
national median,99 suggesting that many workers may have chosen to exit their jobs
after having identified workplace problems.
Third, nearly all of the claims that workers made—represented by the second
column in Figure 2—were internal, made directly to the employer, while only
about 4% of workers chose to make claims in the form of a lawsuit or government
complaint. This may be attributed to workers’ general lack of procedural legal
knowledge: only 22% knew where to file a government complaint. Yet the 4%
external complaint figure suggests that even procedurally knowledgeable workers
may have been unlikely to act on their knowledge, perhaps pointing to a problem
with workers’ incentives around claiming.100
Fourth, though we do not know from these data why some workers chose to
make claims, we do know that the workers who chose not to engage in claiming
behavior did so because they feared retaliation or doubted the efficacy of claims
making. The third column in Figure 2 shows that these beliefs were rational: about
43% of workers who had made a justiciable claim experienced some form of
retaliation for their most recent claim. In addition, when asked why they chose not
to make a claim, 14% of workers reported having witnessed a coworker being
retaliated against. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, of the workers who did make
claims about justiciable workplace problems, only 15% of employers addressed
those claims or promised to do so, while roughly 42% simply ignored the claims or
gave some other response. These statistics again suggest failures in workers’
incentives to make claims.
Thus, the results reported in Part III support our contention that the bottom-up
workplace law enforcement regime may be failing the very workers who most need
protection. Workers do not simply progress up the workplace dispute pyramid
through consecutive phases of naming, blaming, claiming, and resolution. Instead,
our analysis of the Unregulated Work Survey data suggests that workers are
shunted off the pyramid, at minimum, at the naming and claiming stages. We
contend that this drop-off occurs because low-wage, front-line workers often lack
the legal knowledge and incentives needed for bottom-up workplace law
enforcement. Compounding this problem, claiming incentives and legal knowledge
are distributed unevenly among workers. As our analysis suggests, the least
politically, economically, and socially powerful and secure workers were the least
likely to make claims, the most likely to experience retaliation, and the least likely

98. Analysis available from authors.
99. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL 08-1344, EMPLOYEE
TENURE IN 2008 1 (2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives
/tenure_09262008.pdf (“The median number of years that wage and salary workers had been
with their current employer was 4.1 years in January 2008.”).
100. We do not know whether some workers who initially made internal claims later
chose to pursue their claims as lawsuits or government complaints.
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to have accurate substantive and procedural legal knowledge: women, workers
without legal immigration status, and workers with low education levels.
These findings are consistent with other research on worker claiming behavior,
retaliation patterns, and legal knowledge.101 For example, David Weil and Amanda
Pyles have characterized the frequency of worker complaints to the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division and Occupational Safety and
Health Administration as “exceedingly low,” concluding:
Under [the Fair Labor Standards Act], although an average of about
29,000 workers complained each year between 2001 and 2004, when
deflated by the total number of workers, this amounts to an average of
less than 25 complaint cases for every 100,000 workers. The rate was
even lower for [complaints under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act] over the same period, averaging a mere 17 complaints for every
100,000 workers.102
Weil and Pyles also echo our findings on the distribution of claiming behavior,
noting that “workers [who] feel vulnerable to exploitation are less likely to use their
rights—these include immigrant workers, those with less education or fewer skills,
and those in smaller workplaces or in sectors prone to a high degree of informal
work arrangements.”103 Other researchers have made similar observations in the
area of employment discrimination:
[I]t is not clear that litigation protects all kinds of employees equally
well. Most employment discrimination suits are brought by employees
who have already left the job where the discrimination took place.
Further, those ex-employees who bring suit tend to come from the
ranks of managers and professionals rather than from lower-level
workers.104

101. Research on crime-victim reporting patterns is also relevant here. For example,
“[r]esearch indicates that the utilization of formal support services by victims of crime is
relatively low” and that victim characteristics like gender and ethnicity influence the
likelihood of help seeking. Michael R. McCart, Daniel W. Smith & Genelle K. Sawyer, Help
Seeking Among Victims of Crime: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 23 J. TRAUMATIC
STRESS 198, 199–200 (2010). Thanks to Leah Daigle for identifying this literature.
102. Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 69; see also Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth,
Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 76 (1986)
(reporting in study of suit filing among public sector workers in Illinois that “filing is a rare
event,” and “[o]nly 63 of 876 people filed suits (or charges)” regarding workplace
problems).
103. Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 91; see also Mitchell Langbert, Voice Asymmetries in
ERISA Litigation, 16 J. LAB. RES. 455, 462–63 (1995) (noting underrepresentation of women
as plaintiffs in ERISA lawsuits); Willborn, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that workers who sue
tend to be “considerably wealthier than the average employee”).
104. U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS—FINAL REPORT 49–50
(1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004
&context=key_workplace; see also Brake, supra note 72 at 36 (“[T]he social costs of
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With respect to retaliation, a 2012 report by the Ethics Resource Center on the
incidence of retaliation against whistleblowers (workers who uncover and report
unlawful conduct within their companies) found that 45% of employees “observe
misconduct each year,” 65% of those workers blow the whistle, and about one in
five, or 22% of those who choose to become whistleblowers, “perceives retaliation
for doing so.”105 Other studies in a variety of employment settings have found that
fear of retaliation is often the main driver of workers’ decisions not to confront the
workplace problems they identify.106
Other researchers have also found that low-wage, front-line workers routinely
misunderstand their workplace rights. A survey of low-income Latino workers in
Southern states found that “[m]ost people surveyed (about eighty percent) had no
idea how to contact government enforcement agencies such as the Department of
Labor. Many respondents did not know such agencies even exist.”107 Similarly,
only about half of day laborers in an Arizona survey knew the minimum wage,
while a survey of over two thousand contingent workers in twenty states and the
District of Columbia found that 70% of respondents did not know where to report
claiming discrimination are primarily reserved for low-power or stigmatized social
groups.”); Lauren B. Edelman, Scott R. Eliason, Virginia Mellema, Linda H. Krieger &
Catherine R. Albiston, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized
Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 904 (2011) (“Research shows that minorities
and the poor face substantial obstacles in mobilizing legal rights ranging from psychological
and structural barriers to filing claims, to weaker legal counsel, to structural aspects of
litigation that disadvantage parties that lack social clout.” (citations omitted)); Nielsen &
Nelson, supra note 29, at 685 (collecting studies of discrimination claims-making; noting
that relatively few employees who have identified a problem with workplace discrimination
made a claim).
105. ETHICS RES. CTR., RETALIATION: WHEN WHISTLEBLOWERS BECOME VICTIMS: A
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2 (2012),
available at http://www.ethics.org/nbes/index.php.
106. Brake, supra note 72, at 28 (collecting citations to studies) (“Most of the research on
the low level of reporting discrimination has been done in the area of sexual harassment.
Social science literature on sexual harassment abounds with findings showing that sexually
harassed women most often choose coping strategies of avoidance or denial and that the least
likely response is to report the harassment to someone in a position of authority.”); Gleeson,
supra note 66, at 13 (“A significant portion of workers [in a study of low-wage workers in
the San Francisco, California, area] attempt to negotiate with their employer before seeking
legal counsel, yet those who lack English proficiency, and those in the restaurant industry
(which represents one of the largest and least unionized employers in the private sector) are
more likely to have their attempts met with threats. Fear of job loss remains a big hurdle for
workers, who are less likely to approach a government agency directly before coming to a
law clinic if they are still employed, despite clear formal protections against retaliation.”); cf.
EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH MILKMAN, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, LEAVES THAT
PAY: EMPLOYER AND WORKER EXPERIENCES WITH PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA 4–5
(2011), available at http://www.cepr.net/publications/reports/leaves-that-pay (finding that
over one-third of workers “for whom data are available were worried that if they took [paid
family leave for which they were eligible under California law], their employer would be
unhappy, that their opportunities for advancement would be affected, or that they might
actually be fired”).
107. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., UNDER SIEGE: LIFE FOR LOW-INCOME LATINOS IN THE SOUTH 6
(2009), available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/UnderSiege.pdf.
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workplace abuses.108 Likewise, a study of the sexual harassment policy of a large
Midwestern university reported that many administrative and clerical women
employees—relatively more powerful, secure employees compared to the
low-wage, front-line workers surveyed here—were confused about sexual
harassment law as it applied to them.109
Stephen Lee has written about the conditions that give rise to inaccurate
substantive and procedural legal knowledge among low-wage, front-line immigrant
workers in particular. As he has observed, undocumented workers may perceive
government enforcers of labor rights as enforcers of immigration law as well.110 As
a result, they may choose not to report a workplace problem to a government
agency for fear that the report will trigger immigration consequences. Immigrant
workers may also import legal knowledge from their home countries that is
inapplicable in their U.S. workplaces and derive inaccurate beliefs about their
workplace rights from relatively insular information “islands” and ethnic
networks.111

108. Mary Nell Trautner, Erin Hatton & Kelly E. Smith, What Workers Want Depends:
Legal Knowledge and the Desire for Workplace Change Among Day Laborers, 35 LAW &
POL’Y 319 (2013); ABEL VALENZUELA JR., NIK THEODORE, EDWIN MELÉNDEZ & ANA LUZ
GONZALEZ, ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 16 tbl.7 (2006), available at
http://www.urbaneconomy.org/sites/default/files/onthecorner_daylaborinUS_39p_2006.pdf
(cited in Gleeson, supra note 94 at 562).
109. Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the
Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83, 115 (2005); see also
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110, 133 (1998) (quizzing
over 330 unemployed workers on knowledge of at-will employment legal rules and finding
that workers gave correct answers only 51% of the time on average); Pauline T. Kim, Norms,
Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 447, 458 (administering the same survey in multiple additional states; finding
corresponding correct answer rates ranging from 25.2% to 40%); Weil, supra note 23, at 5
n.6 (summarizing the “literature on the lack of knowledge of statutory rights under a variety
of laws”).
110. See Lee, supra note 97, at 1101–03 (discussing unauthorized immigrants’ mistrust
of even friendly or status-neutral U.S. government institutions). This mistrust is rational,
given immigration agents’ history of such tactics as disguising themselves as labor officials
in order to locate, detain, and deport undocumented workers. See U.S. Ends Job “Safety”
Mar.
29,
2006,
available
at
Immigration
Raids,
ASSOCIATED PRESS,
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2006/U-S-Ends-Job-Safety-Immigration-Raids/id-e232
4a8e97a434063791bb95b30ff419 (describing immigration agents masquerading as
occupational health and safety workers). The mistrust persists despite a Memorandum of
Understanding between the U.S. Departments of Labor and Homeland Security that requires
immigration authorities to proceed with caution in detaining and deporting workers involved
in a labor dispute. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REVISED
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY
AND LABOR CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES (2011), available at
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/HispanicLaborForce/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf.
111. As Jennifer Gordon, R.A. Lenhardt, and Shannon Gleeson have observed,
undocumented workers may also lack the legal consciousness, or view of themselves in
relation to the law, to make claims. Gleeson, supra note 94, at 590 (“When asked why they
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A. The Failure of Operational Rights
The drafters of the major federal labor and employment laws were not blind to
the possibility that workers would need incentives to become the drivers of
workplace law enforcement in a bottom-up system.112 As a result, they wrote into
the laws a set of protections and inducements that were meant to tip workers’
cost-benefit scales in the direction of claims making. We call these “operational
rights” because they operationalize or effectuate substantive statutory
protections.113
Operational rights implicitly acknowledge a major contention of this Article,
that workers’ incentives are a key determinant of claiming behavior.114 More
precisely, workers assess the size of the possible benefit they might receive as a
result of a claim, the certainty of receiving that benefit, and how costly the benefit
will be to achieve. They weigh these factors against the benefits and costs of their

chose not to come forward about long days or dangerous working conditions, many
undocumented workers repeatedly explained that to do so would simply not be characteristic
of a good worker, championing their willingness to do work others would not.” (emphasis
omitted)); Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 1161, 1223 (2008) (labeling undocumented workers’ view of themselves as
hardworking and uncomplaining “identity work designed to respond in some way to the
negative stereotypes and stigma associated with their particular groups”); see also Catherine
R. Albiston, Legal Consciousness and Workplace Rights, in NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH: A
CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH 55, 56 (Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth Nielsen eds., 2006)
(defining legal consciousness as “the dynamic process through which actors draw on legal
discourse to construct their understanding of and relation to the social world, but that process
takes place within a social context already structured in part by the law itself”).
112. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)
(“Congress did not seek to secure compliance with [the FLSA’s] prescribed standards
through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to
rely on information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights
claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if
employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances. This ends the prohibition of
[the statute] against discharges and other discriminatory practices was designed to serve. For
it needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce
aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions. By the proscription of
retaliatory acts set forth in [the FLSA] . . . Congress sought to foster a climate in which
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced.” (citation
omitted)).
113. Alexander, supra note 20, at 386; see also Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to
Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 783 (2011) (discussing “suit boosters” or incentives offered to
plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring private litigation).
114. See also Hoyman & Stallworth, supra note 102, at 63 (“The three factors which
determine whether women will file are: 1) expected benefits which are a function of future
positions (job property rights) available in jobs without discrimination; 2) expected costs of
relief (financial and other); 3) resources which are used to file suit rather than pursue other
jobs.”); id. at 62 (“An employee calculates the cost of filing a complaint based on an
estimate of the risks associated with any action to seek relief from discrimination.”); Weil &
Pyles, supra note 7, at 91 (“The likelihood that workers exercise their rights depends on both
the benefits and the risks of doing so. . . .”).
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other options: exit or silent loyalty. Operational rights attempt to increase the size
and certainty of the benefit and reduce the costs of achieving it.115
In the context of private lawsuits, operational rights offer payment (sometimes
double116) for violations of a plaintiff’s rights and extra payments to class
representatives.117 These supplement the benefits that would accrue anyway to
plaintiffs who are successful in a workplace lawsuit: the opportunity to work for an
employer who now complies with the law and the chance to see justice done.
Operational rights also seek to minimize the costs of claiming. They offer the
chance for reimbursed attorneys’ fees for prevailing plaintiffs, and they outlaw
retaliation and provide a private right of action for workers who have been
retaliated against.118 They also allow workers to band together in class or collective
actions to bring joint claims against their employer.119
In the context of government complaints, operational rights also include
agencies’ ability to litigate claims on workers’ behalf at no financial cost to the
worker, their capacity to collect workers’ back pay and other damages owed to
them,120 and agencies’ promise to keep complainants’ identities confidential, at
least during the initial, prelitigation phases of an investigation.121
Yet our analysis of the Unregulated Work Survey data suggests that, despite
their promise, operational rights may be largely ineffective in tipping many
workers’ cost-benefit analyses in the direction of claims. Indeed, those workers
who did make claims nearly universally did so internally, and never filed a lawsuit

115. See Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 91–92.
116. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, plaintiffs may collect double their lost wages as
liquidated damages, unless the defendant shows that its violation of the FLSA was in good
faith. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260 (2006).
117. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing class
representative incentive payments).
118. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s fee
shifting provision); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (same for the FLSA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)
(Title VII’s antiretaliation provision); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (same for the FLSA); see
also Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (describing the
purpose of antiretaliation protections in encouraging lawsuits).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (allowing FLSA plaintiffs to form collective actions by
individually opting into a lawsuit); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (allowing plaintiff class actions).
120. For a description of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division’s
ability to litigate on behalf of and collect workers’ unpaid back wages, see WEIL, supra note
3, passim. For a description of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
capabilities in these areas, see Administrative Enforcement and Litigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/enforcement_litigation.cfm.
121. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission keep employee charges of discrimination confidential
from the public (though not from the defendant), under penalty of a $1,000 fine or
imprisonment of up to one year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). See also Solis v. Seafood Peddler
of San Rafael, No. C 12-0116 PJH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172137, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
4, 2012) (noting that the U.S. Department of Labor may “use the ‘confidential informant’s
privilege’ to shield the identity of the reporting employee(s),” but that “even plaintiff
concedes that the defendants will eventually need to learn the identities of the informants
‘for purposes of trial preparation and impeachment’”).
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or made a government complaint. For low-wage, front-line workers, the costs of
this sort of external, formal claim may be too great, and on the other side of the
scale, the benefits too small.122
First, statutory antiretaliation provisions often do not work, and workers know
this. As Emily Spieler has observed in the context of workers’ compensation,
“[r]etaliatory discharge lawsuits are a useful tool primarily for professionals,
managerial, and other upper income workers,” but not for the low-wage, front-line
workers studied here.123 Likewise, Pauline Kim points out, quoting Cynthia
Estlund:
Anti-retaliation remedies can be invoked only after the employee has
suffered discharge or discipline, and offer, at best, the possibility of an
uncertain remedy after a long delay. . . . Given the difficulties of
pursuing a retaliation claim, [Estlund] argues, “all but the most intrepid
employees will be deterred, or ‘chilled’ from speaking out in ways that
might provoke the employer’s displeasure.”
To put the point more directly, speaking out at the workplace in the
ways that the law encourages is hard.124
Indeed, in our analysis, about 43% of workers who had made claims in the
twelve months prior to the survey had been retaliated against for their most recent
claim. The workers who chose not to make claims listed retaliation-related issues (a
fear of being fired, a fear of having wages or hours cut, and the worker’s
knowledge of retaliation against other workers who had made claims) as three of
the top four reasons they decided to stay silent.
Statutory antiretaliation provisions are simply too narrow and too back-loaded to
be effective in protecting low-wage, front-line workers. The “remedy” that labor
and employment law offers workers who have been retaliated against is a chance to
bring a retaliation claim in court, which may or may not be successful, and which
may be cold (and late) comfort to a worker who has already lost her job, been
deported, or suffered other adverse employment actions. And with the exception of
the FLSA, which offers double damages, a successful retaliation plaintiff is only
restored to her position ex ante, receiving back pay and possibly reinstatement, and
often is not compensated for the costs of the retaliation itself.

122. Weil, supra note 23, at 3 (“[T]he need to keep one’s job trumps other considerations
such as being denied overtime pay or potential exposures to health hazards, let alone issues
related to supervisory treatment that may have no direct legal consequence.”).
123. Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers’ Compensation and the Persistence
of Occupational Injuries, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 119, 230 (1994); see also Langbert, supra note
103, at 459 (“Like other individual rights regulation, ERISA’s emphasis on court remedies
may prove to be of mostly symbolic value for plaintiffs most in need of protection: those
who are low-wage.”).
124. Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
901, 928 (2012) (quoting Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the
Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 135 (1995)); see also Brake, supra note 72, at 20 (“To a large
extent, the effectiveness and very legitimacy of discrimination law turns on people’s ability
to raise concerns about discrimination without fear of retaliation.”).
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In addition, despite some recent broadening of retaliation protections under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Labor Standards Act by the
U.S. Supreme Court,125 retaliation’s definition in workplace statutes and its
interpretation by courts tends to be quite narrow. For example, an employer’s
threats to retaliate may not themselves be actionable, even though they may be just
as effective in silencing workers as when threats are carried out.126 Moreover,
employers may effectively retaliate against one complaining worker as an example
to the rest of the workforce: that one worker may have a cause of action for
retaliation, but her coworkers, who are now scared silent, have no remedy.
For plaintiffs who are undocumented or hold work-contingent visas, the
consequences of retaliation may be especially severe. These workers risk losing not
only their job as a result of a workplace claim, but also their home, as their
employers may report them to immigration authorities.127 Because the downsides
include not only job loss, but also loss of a visa and removal from the country,
workplace claiming becomes even more risky in the transnational labor market in
which immigrants work.128
Second, while complaining to a government agency offers some increased level
of protection—a guarantee of confidentiality, at least initially—a complainant’s
identity must eventually be revealed to an employer once a case moves into
litigation or another form of dispute resolution.129 In this way, a worker’s costs may
increase over the course of the claiming process, requiring the worker to repeatedly
reassess the costs and benefits of claims making. In addition, incompetence and
processing delays may render government agencies an unattractive forum for
workers seeking effective and timely redress for workplace problems.130

125. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335
(2011) (holding that an oral complaint under the FLSA counted as a protected activity for
purposes of the statute’s antiretaliation provisions); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131
S. Ct. 863, 867–68 (2011) (holding that Title VII’s antiretaliation provisions covered
“third-party retaliation,” or reprisals against people associated with the worker who engaged
in protected activity).
126. See, e.g., Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding in a
Title VII case that an employer’s threats to suspend an employee did not amount to “material
adversity” that was actionable under the statute’s antiretaliation provisions).
127. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 886–87 (1984) (describing
employer’s retaliatory reporting of undocumented workers who had engaged in union
organizing to immigration authorities, which either deported the workers or accepted their
voluntary departure from the United States).
128. Charlotte S. Alexander, Explaining Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry Case
Study, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 353, 378–79 (2012) (discussing consequences of
retaliation for immigrant workers).
129. See, e.g., Confidentiality, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/confidentiality.cfm (“Once a charge is filed, the individual's
name and basic information about the allegations of discrimination will be disclosed to the
employer.”).
130. See, e.g., Highlights to U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, WAGE
AND HOUR DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW WAGE
WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT (2009) (“[The Government Accountability
Office’s] overall assessment of the [Wage and Hour Division] complaint intake, conciliation,
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Against these costs, the benefits of claiming appear paltry. Though back pay
may be available to a plaintiff at the end of a lawsuit, if that amount is
insufficiently large—and for plaintiffs who sue because they were paid less than
the minimum wage, back pay awards will, by definition, be quite small—then
enduring the uncertain, stressful, drawn-out process of litigation may not be worth
it.131 Moreover, our analysis reveals that workers doubt the certainty of the benefit
they might receive from claims making: the second-most frequent reason for
workers’ choices not to make claims was that workers doubted their claims would
make any difference. (On top of this, some measure of substantive and procedural
legal knowledge may be necessary for workers even to know what benefits may be
available to them at the end of a lawsuit or government complaint process.)
Changing legal standards have also made it harder for groups of workers to
bring claims as class actions and access the benefit of joint representation.132 In
addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Equal Pay Act, and Age Discrimination in
Employment Act have never allowed traditional class actions, in which a few
named plaintiffs represent a largely anonymous class, but instead require each
individual additional plaintiff to affirmatively opt into a case.133 As a result,
workers are increasingly forced to bring cases alone or in small groups, with each
worker’s identity exposed, setting the stage for retaliation by unscrupulous
employers.
Thus, the failure of operational rights to create appropriate incentives in either
the context of private lawsuits or government complaints means that the risk
associated with enforcement is shifted to the parties who can least bear it. The
workers who are most vulnerable to workplace rights violations in the first place
are also especially unable to bear the costs associated with claiming. As a result,
the would-be law enforcers for whom costs are particularly heavy, the low-wage,
front-line workers studied here, may choose simply to stay silent or to exit and drop
out of the workplace dispute pyramid altogether.

and investigation processes found an ineffective system that discourages wage theft
complaints.”).
131. Willborn, supra note 10, at 7 (“[V]ictims with larger potential awards will be more
likely to enforce for a number of related reasons, such as their ability to obtain counsel, the
likelihood that the award will be larger than the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of suit,
and the likelihood that the expected recovery will still exceed expected costs even as the
probability of winning decreases.”).
132. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012) (discussing Wal-Mart v.
Dukes and AT&T Mobility Limited Liability Company v. Concepcion, which narrowed the
availability of class actions to employment plaintiffs); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming
the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 187 (discussing multiple ways that
court decisions have narrowed the ability of private individuals to bring suit to seek redress
for rights violations).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (incorporating the FLSA’s opt-in requirement into the
Equal Pay Act, which in any case is technically a part of the FLSA); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(2006) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any [FLSA] action unless he gives his
consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which
such action is brought.”); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2006) (incorporating the FLSA’s opt-in
requirement into the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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B. Self-Perpetuating Enforcement Gap
Despite this gloomy picture of workplace law enforcement, it is important to
note that workplace claiming does occur. In fact, private claims under the Fair
Labor Standards Act have risen dramatically over the past decade.134 However,
research has shown that only about 15% of eligible workers opt into, or participate
in, each case.135 This suggests a claiming gap: 85% of workers who could become
bottom-up enforcers of the FLSA and demand their unpaid minimum wage or
overtime pay choose instead not to participate in litigation.136
Likewise, workers do complain to government agencies about workplace
problems, but those complaints may not be coming from the workplaces most in
need of agency enforcement. For example, an analysis of wage and hour complaints
to the U.S. Department of Labor found an “average of less than 25 complaint cases
for every 100,000 workers” and “only modest overlap” between complaints and
employers’ compliance with Fair Labor Standards Act requirements.137 In other
words, the “market” in complaints may be failing to identify the workplaces most
in need of agency intervention.138
This produces, in the end, a self-perpetuating enforcement gap in low-wage
workplaces, in which worker claims are the driver of workplace law enforcement
but only about half of workers are likely to make claims. Employers know this, and
the unscrupulous among them feel free to underpay workers’ wages, discriminate,

134. See Table C-2A: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit,
During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2008 Through 2012, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices
/C02ASep12.pdf (listing 5393 Fair Labor Standards Act cases filed in federal court in fiscal
year 2008 compared to 8152 cases filed in fiscal year 2012).
135. Charlotte S. Alexander, Would an Opt In Requirement Fix the Class Action
Settlement? Evidence from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 80 MISS. L.J. 443, 466 (2010)
(reporting opt-in rate in FLSA cases of 15%); see also Rutti v. Lojack Corp., No. SACV 06350 DOC (JCx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107677, *14–20 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) (noting
problems with the FLSA opt-in structure that tend to discourage opting in by fearful,
apathetic, inertia-bound workers, and those who lack legal knowledge).
136. Moreover, most of the FLSA suits that are filed are likely brought by managers
claiming to have been illegally misclassified as exempt from overtime, not by low-wage,
front-line workers who are making minimum wage claims.
137. Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 69, 73.
138. For statistics on the background level of workplace rights violations in low-wage
workplaces, see BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 35, at 2 (“We found that many employment
and labor laws are regularly and systematically violated, impacting a significant part of the
low-wage labor force in the nation’s largest cities.”); Donald M. Kerwin with Kristin
McCabe, Labor Standards Enforcement and Low-Wage Immigrants: Creating an Effective
Enforcement System, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 21 (2011) (claiming that “there is substantial
evidence that unauthorized immigrants work at high rates in industries with long track
records of labor standards violations” and listing agriculture, meat, poultry, and fish
processing, garment assembly, and sewing as industries in which wage and hour violations
are “endemic”); Siobhán McGrath, A Survey of Literature Estimating the Prevalence of
Employment and Labor Law Violations in the U.S., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 15,
2005), http://brennan.3cdn.net/bdeabea099b7581a26_srm6br9zf.pdf.
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maintain unsafe working conditions, engage in unfair labor practices, and otherwise
violate workers’ rights with relative impunity.139 Workers are overdeterred from
claiming, while employers are underdeterred from complying.
V. ALTERNATIVES
This Part examines alternatives to the current bottom-up workplace law
enforcement regime. Heeding John Coffee’s admonition that “the academic
reformer has a duty to specify not only what the optimal solution is, but what the
first tentative steps are that should be taken toward it,”140 we first propose reforms
that would address the problems of lack of legal knowledge and claiming
incentives among low-wage, front-line workers. These changes would preserve the
bottom-up structure of workplace law enforcement, but would attempt to do a
better job of increasing benefits and decreasing costs than the present system of
operational rights, thereby preventing claims from escaping the workplace dispute
pyramid.
Possible reforms include minimizing bottom-up enforcers’ costs by
strengthening retaliation protections, eliminating the opt-in requirement of some
employment statutes, and establishing an arbitration system that workers could
choose to access to achieve a quick resolution of their claims. On the benefits side,
we consider sweetening the proverbial pot by lifting damages caps, offering treble
damages, and making punitive damages more readily available.141

139. As Weil and Pyles put it, “an instrinsic [sic] problem arising from the statutory
structure of workplace rights is that if left to the decision of an individual worker, the
threshold for exercise of rights lies above the threshold optimal from the workplace—and
societal—level.” Weil & Pyles, supra note 7, at 86.
140. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 286 (1983).
141. Each of these solutions focuses specifically on reforming bottom-up workplace law
enforcement rather than empowering workers generally to change conditions at work. If this
were the broader goal, then union organizing and worker centers, among other solidaritybuilding strategies, would certainly need to be added to the mix. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon,
We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the
Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995) (describing the
operation of a worker center in advocating for worker rights and empowerment). In fact,
Allison Morantz has demonstrated that the unionization of a workplace can not only
empower workers, but also increase legal compliance, at least in the area of mine health and
safety. Alison D. Morantz, Coal Mine Safety: Do Unions Make a Difference?, 66 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 88 (2013). In addition, other reform methods harnessing technology and
market discipline are possible. For example, the U.S. Department of Labor has recently
developed a smartphone app that allows consumers to research whether a particular business
owes its employees back wages or has been cited for health and safety violations. R. Moore,
Eat Shop Sleep, ITUNES, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/eat-shop-sleep/id465262611?mt=8
(app updated Mar. 19, 2012). Similarly, the new initiative Coworker.org allows workers to
launch online petitions and organize themselves virtually across companies and industries to
call attention to problems on the job. COWORKER.ORG, http://www.coworker.org/. Finally,
including better measures of job quality in corporate social responsibility (CSR) indices
might recruit activist consumers to the project of improving low-wage work by directing
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Second, we consider workplace law enforcement regimes that would rely less
heavily on workers themselves to initiate claims. Here, we propose increasing
top-down, government investigative, and prosecutorial activity, and setting
government enforcement priorities such that agencies take action in the workplaces
where workers are least likely to step forward themselves. This set of proposals is
far from comprehensive, and is meant to complement calls for reform previously
suggested by other scholars and advocates.142
Of course, proposals to increase the level of workplace law enforcement beg the
question of what the desirable level of enforcement is in the first place.143 One’s
answer might depend on whether one is an employer or an employee, or whether
one is more likely to become a claimant in a workplace dispute or the target of such
a claim. Nevertheless, increased enforcement of labor and employment standards
would likely benefit both employers and employees. Employees benefit from
lawful pay, safe working conditions, and nondiscriminatory policies; employers
benefit by operating on a level playing field, without being undercut by competitors
who save money by paying lower wages, skimping on costly safety measures, or
otherwise disregarding their legal obligations. Indeed, though one might argue that
increased workplace law enforcement could increase employers’ costs and thereby
eliminate jobs, legal compliance should not be an optional cost. At the very least,
any given employer’s legal compliance should not hinge on the characteristics of
its workforce, with employers of low-wage, front-line workers particularly able to
evade detection by silencing potential claims.144
their dollars toward companies with high CSR values in the labor and employment category.
See, e.g., Leonardo Becchetti & Rocco Ciciretti, Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock
Market Performance, 19 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 1283 (2009) (describing corporate social
responsibility rankings issued by RiskMetrics-KLD, which include items around employee
relations).
142. See, e.g., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, JUST PAY: IMPROVING WAGE AND HOUR
ENFORCEMENT AT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (2010), available at http://www
.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2010/JustPayReport2010.pdf?nocdn=1 (proposing improvements to the
U.S. Department of Labor’s operations); Estlund, supra note 6, at 319 (proposing monitored
self-regulation of company compliance with labor standards); Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable
and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective
Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179 (1994) (making a series of proposals for FLSA reform);
Daniel C. Lopez, Note, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class
Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 308 (2009) (same); WEIL, supra
note 3 (proposing improvements to the U.S. Department of Labor’s operations).
143. For an attempt to identify rational criteria for enforcement of laws, see, for example,
George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 55 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974); see also
Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9 (2010)
(discussing methods of optimizing law enforcement).
144. The question of whether increased workplace law enforcement would in fact
decrease employment levels is an empirical one that merits study. Similar predictions have
been made with respect to the negative effects of a minimum wage increase on employment
levels, but repeated studies have called these theories into question. See, e.g., Liana Fox,
Minimum Wage Trends: Understanding Past and Contemporary Research at 1 (Econ. Policy
Inst., Briefing Paper No. 178, 2006) (“There is a growing view among economists that the
minimum wage offers substantial benefits to low-wage workers without negative effect.
Although there are still dissenters, the best recent research has shown that the job loss
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A. Disseminating Legal Knowledge
At first glance, the goal of disseminating legal knowledge—a necessary
condition for workplace claims—would seem to be low hanging policy fruit.
However, educating workers effectively about their substantive and procedural
legal rights is a relatively complex and difficult endeavor. Many employers,
including those covered by the Unregulated Work Survey, are already required to
post information on a variety of workers’ rights. In fact, the U.S. Department of
Labor provides eleven different “know your rights” posters, in a variety of
languages, that employers may be required to display in the workplace.145 Yet our
findings that approximately 59% of low-wage, front-line workers did not know
their minimum wage and overtime rights and 78% did not know how to file a
government complaint (both subjects of Department of Labor posters) suggest that
this method of disseminating legal knowledge is highly ineffective. Moreover,
Pauline Kim’s theory that powerful social norms can override explicit employerprovided messages about legal rights calls into question whether the workplace is
the most appropriate place for educating workers about their legal rights and
protections.146
Instead, advocacy groups, unions, worker centers, and government agencies
should distribute materials, hang posters, give presentations, perform skits, and
make announcements in the places where workers are otherwise accustomed to
receiving information: at places of worship, at community centers, at festivals and
fairs, on the radio, and on television. These outreach efforts could specifically

reported in earlier analyses does not, in fact, occur when the minimum wage is increased.”).
145. See Poster Page: Workplace Poster Requirements for Small Businesses and Other
Employers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/oasam/boc/osdbu/sbrefa/poster
/matrix.htm. States have also experimented with notice and posting requirements of various
specificity. See, e.g., Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, Wage Theft Protection Act,
CA.GOV (Apr. 2013), http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Governor_signs_Wage_Theft_Protection
_Act_of_2011.html (describing California’s notice template requiring specific information
on rates of pay, pay schedules, workers’ compensation, and overtime); Notice of Pay Rate,
N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.labor.ny.gov/workerprotection/laborstandards
/employer/wage-theft-prevention-act.shtm (describing the notice requirements of New
York’s Wage Theft Prevention Act, which requires disclosure of detailed pay information in
English and in the worker’s native language; making notices available in Spanish, Chinese,
Haitian Creole, Korean, Polish, or Russian).
146. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information, supra note 109, at 110
(“[R]espondents overwhelmingly misunderstand the background legal rules governing the
employment relationship. More specifically, they consistently overestimate the degree of job
protection afforded by law, believing that employees have far greater rights not to be fired
without good cause than they in fact have.” (emphasis omitted)); Kim, Norms, Learning, and
Law, supra note 109, at 447 (“Contrary to the assumption commonly made by defenders of
the at-will rule, [surveys of workers in Missouri, New York, and California] indicate that
workers do not understand the default presumption [of at-will employment], but erroneously
believe that the law affords them protection akin to a just cause contract, when, in fact, they
can be dismissed at will.”); see also Gleeson, supra note 94, at 562 (“[I]t is clear that
immigrant workers, like the average low-wage worker, often lack sufficient knowledge
about the laws governing work in America. Language barriers and lack of culturally
appropriate information intensify this barrier.”).
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target the groups of workers shown by our analysis to be less likely to have
accurate substantive and procedural legal knowledge: undocumented workers,
those employed by relatively small or low-road employers, and women workers.
The U.S. Department of Labor’s “We Can Help” initiative is an example of this
sort of campaign, incorporating language-appropriate public service
announcements and materials designed specifically to assure undocumented
workers that they have substantive workplace rights and to educate them on
enforcement procedures.147 Perhaps in this way accurate substantive and procedural
legal knowledge will find its way into the web of information that workers carry
with them into the workplace and that influences their ability and willingness to
make claims on the job.
Because lawyers themselves can also be sources of information about the law,
access to legal advice and representation may be a key component to increasing
workers’ legal knowledge. Though the phenomenon of lawyers ginning up cases by
recruiting potential plaintiffs is often portrayed negatively by the media and
academic commentators, little attention is paid to the potentially salutary function
of so-called ambulance chasers and bounty hunters.148 Lawyers who take an active
role in outreach efforts, whether to recruit clients or merely to perform a public
service, serve a valuable education and empowerment function. Increasing access
to legal services may then help address the legal knowledge deficit suggested by
the data analyzed in this Article. (Though the survey data do not answer the
question of whether lawyers were available to the respondents, lawyer usage was
likely very low, as only 4% of workers chose to take their claims to any third party
or intermediary outside the company.)149
However, legal knowledge alone, even when paired with attorney access, is not
enough to set the wheels of bottom-up workplace law enforcement into motion and
send claims up the dispute resolution pyramid. Even the most informed worker may
still choose not to make a claim, because the costs of claiming outweigh the
benefits. A brief story, recounted in a Human Rights Watch report, illustrates this
point.150 In 1999, 500 men came to North Carolina from Mexico with temporary,
H-2A “guestworker” visas to work as farm laborers. Before they arrived, staff from
a legal services organization had given them information booklets written in
Spanish that described the U.S. laws that governed their wages and working

147. See Wage & Hour Div., supra note 91.
148. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency
Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006)
(describing and countering criticisms of plaintiffs’ class action lawyers).
149. Study after study has documented the gulf between civil legal needs and lawyer
availability, particularly for ex ante legal advice. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of
Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the Corporate Practice of Law 1 (Ctr. in Law,
Econ. & Org., Research Papers Series No. C12-16, 2012) (gathering studies and noting that
“ordinary people are largely shut out from legal assistance; the great majority of legal work
is done for corporations, organizations and governments”).
150. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 218–25 (2000),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/us/uslbr008.pdf.
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conditions and explained the process of obtaining free legal services if their rights
were violated.
When the workers arrived in North Carolina, they attended an orientation
session. Their employer warned them that the legal services organization was their
enemy, to be avoided.151 He then told them to throw away their booklets and
distributed an employee handbook, which warned:
FLS [Farmworker Legal Services] has a hidden motive when they
approach you. They say that they are your friends and they are
concerned about your rights and well being [sic], but in reality their
motive is to destroy the program which brings you to North Carolina
legally . . . FLS discourage [sic] the growers with excessive suits which
are for the most part without merit. The history of FLS shows that the
workers who have talked with them have harmed themselves. Don’t be
fooled and allow them to take away your jobs.152
On the wall at the orientation site also hung a banner which read, in Spanish,
“Legal Services Want to Destroy the H-2A Program” and “Don’t be a puppet of
Legal Services.”153 Workers reported feeling that “if they keep [the] booklets or if
they are ever seen with one of [the] booklets, they will be fired or have serious
problems” with their employer.154
In the eyes of worker advocates, the story of the legal services booklet describes
a nearly perfectly-executed “know-your-rights” campaign.155 Workers received
language-appropriate materials that fully explained their substantive and procedural
legal rights. They even knew whom to call to get free legal representation if they
ran into a problem. Yet even full substantive and procedural legal knowledge was
likely neutralized by employer threats. Though we do not know from the report, it
would be surprising if any of the North Carolina H-2A workers actually made
claims about workplace problems that harvest season. Instead, in Hirschman’s
construction, they likely chose exit or silent loyalty over voice.

151. Id. at 218 (“[The workers’ employer] spoke at length about the Farmworker Unit of
Legal Services of North Carolina . . . He told the workers that Legal Services was their
‘enemy.’ He told the workers they should avoid Legal Services.”).
152. Id. at 218–19 (“‘Mr. Hill then held up a copy of the ‘Know Your Rights’ booklet
produced by Legal Services. He ordered workers to toss the ‘Know Your Rights’ booklet
into the trash can. . . .’ Following Hill’s admonition, workers discarded their booklets en
masse.” (emphasis in original)).
153. Id. at 221.
154. Id. at 220.
155. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, A. Rachel Camp, Margaret E. Johnson, Catherine
F. Klein & Lisa V. Martin, Teaching Social Justice Lawyering: Systematically Including
Community Legal Education in Law School Clinics, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 401, 404 (2012)
(characterizing effective community legal education, including know-your-rights campaigns,
as that which “‘encourag[es] planning on the basis of legal rights and obligations’;
‘mobiliz[es] individuals and groups to pursue their rights’; ‘facilitat[es] and strengthen[s]
community organizations’; ‘foster[s] self-help activities for which lawyers will not be
necessary’; and ‘demystif[ies] the law’”).
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B. Minimizing the Costs
How, then, can workers be convinced to make claims? Part III has illustrated
that roughly 48% of workers in the Unregulated Work Survey who had identified
workplace problems chose not to make claims; Part IV has detailed the failure of
the current system of operational rights to maximize workers’ benefits and
minimize the costs of claiming. We suggest the following strategies to further
minimize the risks faced by would-be bottom-up workplace law enforcers.
First, Congress and the courts should strengthen existing retaliation protections
within labor and employment laws by broadening the definition of “adverse
employment action” to unambiguously include threats.156 This would acknowledge
the chilling effect that such threats, even if never executed, have on workplace
claiming behavior. It would also likely address the prevalence of non-actionable
reprisals in the workplace, as illustrated by the 28% of workers in this analysis who
made claims about justiciable workplace problems and then faced forms of
retaliation that fell outside the coverage of labor and employment law.
However, it is important to note that even legal regimes with extremely robust
anti-retaliation provisions can fail to protect claimants and encourage claiming
behavior. For example, Richard Moberly has reviewed the success of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Public Company Accounting Reform and Corporate Responsibility
Act, which concerns corporate accounting standards and is considered the “gold
standard” among retaliation protections in encouraging whistleblower claims.157 He
reports that “the percentage of employee tips actually decreased after
Sarbanes-Oxley” and that “the Act often failed to protect [whistleblowers] from
reprisals and failed to compensate them consistently for the retaliation they
suffered.”158
To make it harder for employers to identify the workers to retaliate against, then,
our second proposal is that Congress should eliminate the opt-in requirement of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Equal Pay Act, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. Particularly for low-wage, front-line workers, the opt-in
requirement acts as a barrier to participation in litigation because it requires
workers to take the very public step of joining a lawsuit, rather than being part of
an anonymous class represented by a few named plaintiffs.159 Anonymous class

156. Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, Threats, and the Silencing of the
Brown Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779 (2013) (arguing that courts should recognize
a cause of action for “per se” or “facial” violations of statutory anti-retaliation provisions to
cover threats by employers designed to silence workers’ future potential protected activity).
See generally Levinson, supra note 84; Clemons, supra note 84.
157. Public Company Accounting Reform and Corporate Responsibility (SarbanesOxley) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012); Estlund, supra note 6, at 376 (“Sarbanes-Oxley
represents the gold standard in protection of employee whistleblowers, with both criminal
sanctions and fully compensatory private civil remedies against reprisals.”).
158. Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64
S.C. L. REV. 1, 27−29 (2012) (emphasis in original) (noting that only 1.8% of employees
who made claims of retaliation won their case before an administrative body, and no
employee won for three straight years).
159. Alexander, supra note 135, at 484 (“In many ways, the opt in requirement of the
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membership protects workers from retaliation, because employers may not be able
to identify with certainty which particular workers are participating in a lawsuit.
Moreover, workers have some measure of deniability, because they are included in
the plaintiff class not because they chose to join, but rather because they fall into
the class definition. Of course, this feature of the opt-out class action available
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 has been criticized for being
undemocratic and discouraging plaintiff autonomy.160 However, this criticism fails
to recognize the benefits of the anonymous, automatic nature of the traditional class
action for low-wage, front-line plaintiffs who are extremely susceptible to
retaliation.161 Thus, all areas of employment law should be made consistent with the
great majority of federal statutes, in which plaintiffs are permitted to use the class
action device of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and receive the protection of
relative anonymity within the class.162
Third, we propose an alternative method of claim resolution. For justiciable
workplace claims that are not already covered by an administrative exhaustion
requirement, the U.S. Department of Labor should establish an optional, one-way
binding arbitration system, modeled on a program in place at The Coca-Cola
Company, that would give workers a forum for speedy claim resolution.163 This
FLSA seems to eliminate any possibility of collective action, making the FLSA enforceable
only by individuals or very small groups. The opt in requirement may, therefore, undermine
the project of law enforcement generally, dissuading plaintiffs from acting collectively as
private attorneys general to enforce the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime mandates.”).
At the very least, courts should permit language in the opt-in notice that advises
undocumented workers that their immigration status is not relevant to the case. See, e.g.,
Enriquez v. Cherry Hill Market Corp., Case No. 10-CV-5616-FB-MDG, (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10,
2012), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nyedce
/1:2010cv05616/312066/36/0.pdf?ts=1328966650 (order approving FLSA opt-in notice
language informing potential opt-in plaintiffs that their immigration status is irrelevant).
160. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 135, at 484–86 (summarizing criticisms of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 class actions).
161. Research is being conducted on the benefits of anonymity in the analogous
whistleblower context and one study has found that “anonymity, trust, and risk are highly
salient in the [whistle-blowing reporting system] context.” Paul Benjamin Lowry, Gregory
D. Moody, Dennis F. Galletta & Anthony Vance, The Drivers in the Use of Online
Whistle-Blowing Reporting Systems, 30 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 153, 154 (2013); see also Weil,
supra note 23, at 13 (noting “over two decades of evidence that shows that workers are more
likely to exercise rights given the presence of a collective workplace actor”).
162. We acknowledge that class members’ identities are often exposed at the end of a
lawsuit when they must collect their portion of settlement or judgment proceeds. However,
the risk of retaliation at this point is relatively low, as the litigation has already concluded.
We also acknowledge that courts have restricted the Rule 23 class action as a vehicle for
collective complaint, but we nevertheless think it preferable to the current opt-in regime in
place in the Fair Labor Standards Act, Equal Pay Act, and Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.
163. Suzette M. Malveaux, Is It the “Real Thing”? How Coke’s One-Way Binding
Arbitration May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL.
77, 78 (2009) (“This unilateral arrangement—voluntarily adopted by the Coca-Cola
Company following its historic employment discrimination class action settlement—is a
groundbreaking and novel approach to promoting arbitration, while also protecting employee
choice and access to the court system. One-way binding arbitration also offers employers an
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system would not increase the size or certainty of the benefits of claiming, but
would reduce the costs associated with trying to achieve those benefits. The
program could be funded by civil monetary penalties collected by the Department
from law-breaking employers, and arbitration would be free for workers who could
demonstrate financial need, much as in forma pauperis determinations are made.
The parties could choose to use this system at their discretion, and, as in CocaCola’s system, the arbitrator’s decision would be binding on the employer only.164
Particularly for workers who have been fired in retaliation for claims making, this
system would allow them to collect back pay and/or return to their jobs more
quickly than in a typical lawsuit, without requiring them to relinquish their right to
file their claim in court. Employers, too, would benefit from the speed and
efficiency of arbitration.165 (Employees with group claims, however, would still
have to pursue their claims in court, as arbitration would not be well-suited for
resolutions of collective or class actions.166)
Each of these proposals seeks to lower the costs of claims making by increasing
retaliation protections, facilitating group action by plaintiffs, and speeding up the
process of workplace dispute resolution. However, as Steven Willborn has
observed, minimizing worker costs may not be effective in and of itself in
encouraging claims; increasing the benefits may also be necessary.167
C. Maximizing the Benefits
Workers might also be incentivized to act if there were greater benefits
associated with making claims. Here, Congress could lift the cap on Title VII

opportunity to forge new ground. Companies can enjoy all of the benefits of arbitration—
such as efficiency, privacy, cost savings and litigation avoidance—while bolstering
workplace relations that may enhance profitability.”); see also David Sherwyn, J. Bruce
Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes:
Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999) (arguing that employees should reconsider arbitration as a
tool for speedy resolution of disputes).
164. Malveaux, supra note 163, at 78−79 (describing Coca-Cola’s “one-way binding
arbitration” program).
165. Id. at 119–20 (describing benefits to employers of one-way binding arbitration
system including speed, efficiency, improved employee perception, and advantage in future
litigation).
166. Id. at 134–35 (“Finally, while [Coca-Cola’s] Solutions program may be appropriate
for addressing individual employee work-related matters, it is not appropriate for resolving
class actions or other actions alleging systemic corporate misbehavior. Because of the
important role the courts play in resolving cases with larger societal implications, employees
must be permitted to challenge an employer’s pattern or practice of conduct without having
to go through an internal company resolution process. The judiciary’s unique public function
and procedural attributes make it especially well-suited for addressing large-scale
employment issues.”) (emphasis in original).
167. Willborn, supra note 10, at 12–13 (“[E]ven with retaliation protection, individuals
are more likely to come forward in situations in which there is little risk of retaliation than in
situations where they have to rely on retaliation protections. In turn, this implies that positive
inducements, rather than protection against negative consequences, may be necessary to
produce adequate private enforcement in some circumstances.”).
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damages,168 make punitive damages more readily available to plaintiffs, especially
in cases of retaliation,169 and allow plaintiffs to collect treble damages, perhaps
upon a showing of outrageous conduct and/or recidivism by the defendant.170
Federal statutes in areas other than labor and employment provide models for
offering increased incentives to expose wrongdoing. For example, the Internal
Revenue Service entices people to report tax fraud by offering between 15% and
30% of the back taxes and other funds ultimately collected by the Service;171 the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act offers
whistleblowers between 10% and 30% of monies recovered as a result of tips about
insider trading and other violations of securities law;172 the qui tam provision of the
False Claims Act allows people who report fraud against the federal government to
collect up to 30% of recovered damages.173
However, in practice, such incentives may not be very effective at encouraging
claims making. A study of federal statutory whistleblower incentives reveals that,
“although [individual] rewards under existing whistleblower programs may be
substantial, general use of the programs is not high.”174 This, again, points to the

168. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006) (imposing caps on Title VII damages of between
$50,000 and $300,000 depending on employer size).
169. At present, punitive damages are generally not available for retaliation claims under
the FLSA, the National Labor Relations Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and are available, but with statutory caps, under Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (“A complaining party [under Title VII] may recover punitive damages
under this section against a respondent . . . if the complaining party demonstrates that the
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (capping Title VII damages at between $50,000 and $300,000 depending
on employer size); Jackson v. Estelle’s Place, LLC, 391 Fed. Appx. 239, 247 (4th Cir. 2010)
(noting that punitive damages “are not available for claims under the FLSA”); Alvarado v.
Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1265, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting courts’ “divergent
approaches” to availability of punitive damages for ADA retaliation claims and holding that
punitive damages are not available); Farrell v. Tri-Cnty. Metro. Transp. Dist., 530 F.3d 1023,
1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is well-settled that the FMLA, by its terms, ‘only provides for
compensatory damages and not punitive damages.’” (quoting Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d
1125, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003))); NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Fayetteville, Inc., 258
F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that “an explicitly punitive method of calculation [of
backpay] is contrary to the purposes of the [National Labor Relations] Act”).
170. The Fair Labor Standards Act already allows plaintiffs to collect double or liquidated
damages. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2006). The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act both allow collection of treble damages. Trusts in Restraint of Trade
Illegal, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1961 (2006).
171. Karie Davis-Nozemack & Sarah Webber, Paying the IRS Whistleblower: A Critical
Analysis of Collected Proceeds, 32 VA. TAX REV. 77, 86 (2012).
172. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376,
1957 (2010).
173. Civil Actions for False Claims, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)–(d) (2006).
174. Jonathan L. Awner & Denise Dickins, Will There Be Whistleblowers?, 34 REG. 36, 39
(2011). At the time of writing, the Dodd-Frank Act was still fairly new, and so the success of its
whistleblower incentive provisions are still relatively untested. In addition, in 2012, an IRS
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tricky problem of cost and benefit: if existing reward programs
sophisticated potential whistleblowers in the financial sector have been
unsuccessful in incentivizing claims,175 it is likely that the analog in the
employment law context—offering much higher damages awards as an
potential benefit for plaintiffs—may also fail to encourage low-wage,
workers to exercise voice.176
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D. Increasing Government Enforcement
Each of the foregoing reforms would preserve the fundamental bottom-up nature
of workplace law enforcement, while attempting to improve workers’ legal
knowledge and recalibrate their incentive structures such that low-wage, front-line
workers might be enabled to act as enforcers of their workplace rights. However,
given the fundamental problems with bottom-up enforcement suggested by the
Unregulated Work Survey data, such tinkering around the margins might be
insufficient, akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
A more fundamental reform would advocate shifting more enforcement from the
bottom to the top, increasing government investigation and oversight rather than
relying so heavily on workers themselves to be the drivers of enforcement activity.
After all, government enforcement agents are insulated from many of the risks
faced by worker-claimants: their salaries are paid regardless of the outcome of a
lawsuit, and they are unaffected by defendant retaliation.177
Michael Waterstone has made just such a proposal in the disability law context.
He argues that certain case types—failure to hire and public accessibility—are
particularly well suited to public enforcement.178 In the labor and employment
context, Steven Willborn has suggested case types that would be appropriate for
increased government enforcement, in areas where private litigation leaves gaps:
“low-damages cases, large cases which involve heavy litigation-related
investments, and violations not producing wage losses.”179 Likewise, David Weil
has advocated that the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division focus
its investigative resources on “fissured” industries, in which businesses employ
tipster received an unprecedented award of $104 million. Paul Sullivan, The Price
Whistle-Blowers Pay for Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2012, at B1. It remains to be seen
whether this highly-publicized award will increase the level of IRS whistleblower activity.
175. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 174 (describing the costs that whistleblowers pay, “If
you look at the field of whistle-blowers, you see a high degree of bankruptcies. You may
find yourself unemployable. Home foreclosures, divorce, suicide and depression all go with
this territory.”).
176. In addition, research has shown that, among the options of rewards, liabilities,
duties, and protections, the availability of rewards for reporting illegal conduct may trigger
“less reporting than merely offering protection or establishing a duty.” Feldman & Lobel,
supra note 21, at 1155.
177. See Yaniv, supra note 5, at 352 (“While the expected gain from complaining is
obvious, there is a serious risk involved: losing one’s job. However, when a worker’s
complaint is placed anonymously (or when the enforcement agency is bound not to disclose
his identity), there is no reason to expect a personal reaction on the part of his employer.”).
178. Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434,
437 (2007).
179. Willborn, supra note 10, at 13.
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high numbers of subcontractors and other contingent workers and disclaim any
legal responsibility for wages and working conditions.180
To these lists we add cases in which workers would be particularly unlikely to
complain on their own, where workers have low levels of substantive and
procedural legal knowledge, and where workers are highly susceptible to
retaliation. Indeed, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s most
recent Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP) names as an enforcement priority
“[p]rotecting [i]mmigrant, [m]igrant, and [o]ther [v]ulnerable [w]orkers,” and calls
for a focus on “[i]ssues affecting workers who may lack an awareness of their legal
protections, or who may be reluctant or unable to exercise their rights.”181
In implementing goals such as these, government enforcers could develop a sort
of “vulnerability index,” taking into account workers’ wages, immigration status,
unionization levels, and education levels within a particular industry.182 Industries
with high vulnerability index scores could be prioritized in agencies’ strategic
enforcement plans.183 Likewise, agencies might prioritize retaliation cases and send
a message to unscrupulous employers that they will not be permitted to silence
worker claims through threatened and actual reprisals.

180. WEIL, supra note 3, at 18–26.
181. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN: FY
2013–2016, 1, 8 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm. The EEOC has
also explored using the commissioner’s charge mechanism strategically, considering “factors
such as current economic conditions, demographic data, relevant labor markets, industry
data, underserved areas or populations and charge data.” LESLIE E. SILVERMAN ET AL.,
SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT: TO THE CHAIR OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION 15 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/systemic.cfm.
182. Martha Albertson Fineman’s extensive work on vulnerability provides a theoretical
backdrop for creation of a vulnerability index; Kerry Rittich’s work on employee
vulnerability is informative as well. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 20–21
(2008) (“The vulnerability inquiry examines the ways in which societal resources are
channeled to see if the result is to privilege and protect some while tolerating the
disadvantage and vulnerability of others. This focus on the structuring of societal institutions
reflects the fact that the state has an affirmative obligation not to privilege any group of
citizens over others and to actively structure conditions for equality.”); KERRY RITTICH, LAW
COMM’N OF CAN., VULNERABILITY AT WORK: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE NEW
ECONOMY 3 (2004) (“Vulnerability and insecurity at work can arise from: 1) the distribution
of risks, costs, benefits and powers among workers and employers; 2) the (in)capacity of
workers to conform to or perform according to workplace rules and norms; 3) the allocation
of work among workers, including unpaid work; 4) (in)access to resources; 5)
discrimination, either directly on the basis of a particular characteristics or grounds or
through their intersectional operation or indirectly, because of the connection between these
grounds and the factors listed above.”).
183. The U.S. Department of Labor’s public communications speak of advocacy on
behalf of “vulnerable workers” such as homeless people, but do not appear to define that
term. See, e.g., Vulnerable Workers, U.S DEP’T LAB. NEWS BRIEF, Oct. 18, 2012, available
at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/newsletter/2012/20121018.pdf (reporting on “roundtable
discussions” between U.S. Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis and “representatives of vulnerable
communities in Seattle, New Orleans and San Francisco”).
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However, as Cynthia Estlund has observed, it may not be realistic to expect
“regulators’ sights . . . to remain permanently fixed on the targeted sectors,” as
there will “simply never be enough government inspectors to do the job alone.”184
Nor would a completely top-down labor and employment inspectorate-type system
be desirable, as it would throw the benefits of bottom-up enforcement out with the
proverbial bathwater.185 Public and private workplace law enforcement should exist
in a complementary relationship, in which one mode of enforcement compensates
for the failings and inadequacies of the other. We have argued here that the current
system of bottom-up workplace law enforcement relies too heavily on workers
themselves to be claims-makers. A reinvigorated, targeted, top-down enforcement
regime, along with reforms to the bottom-up system to expand workers’ legal
knowledge and offer better incentives for claims making, would draw on the
strengths of both modes of enforcement and, we hope, ultimately improve
conditions for low-wage, front-line workers.

184. Estlund, supra note 6, at 362, 403.
185. See supra Introduction (outlining bottom-up enforcement’s theoretical benefits); see
also Kevin Kolben, The WTO Distraction, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 483 (2010)
(describing problems in countries with top-down labor inspectorate systems of “weak
enforcement and poor compliance by the regulated, [and] almost negligible, understaffed,
and corrupt labor inspectorates”).
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APPENDIX A: UNREGULATED WORK SURVEY QUESTIONS
Survey Questions Related to Workplace Problems and Claims
1.

During the last 12 months, did you make a complaint, either by yourself or
with co-workers, about your working conditions, by going to your
employer, supervisor or going to a government agency? Don’t tell me yet
about any attempts you may have made to form a labor union, we’ll get to
that later.
a.
b.

Yes
No

2.

How many times did you make a complaint, either alone or with your
co-workers, over the past 12 months? Remember, I’m talking about
complaints that you made about a job here in CITY.
a. None, never made complaint
b. 1–96 times
c. More than 96 times (SPECIFY)

3.

Tell me about the most recent complaint you made. What specifically did
you complain about? Choose all that apply.
a. Paid below the minimum wage
b. Not paid for all hours worked
c. Forced to work off the clock
d. Not paid for overtime
e. Not paid on time
f. Improper deductions from paycheck
g. Dangerous working conditions
h. Discrimination
i. Abuse or harassment by supervisor
j. Abuse or harassment by co-worker
k. No breaks, or not enough breaks
l. Bad schedule/shift
m. Needed a raise/pay is too low
n. Lack of health insurance or paid sick days
o. Increased workloads—made me/us work more
p. Other (SPECIFY)

4.

Did you make this complaint by yourself, or with your co-workers?
a. Myself
b. With co-workers
c. Both186

186. We coded “both” responses as claims made with co-workers rather than alone.
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5.

When did you make this most recent complaint?
a. ENTER YEAR (2006–2008):
b. ENTER MONTH (1–12):

6.

How did you make this complaint? Choose all that apply.
a. Discussed the problem with supervisor or employer.
b. Asked a lawyer, union representative, worker center, or other
community group to complain to employer on your behalf.
c. Filed a complaint with an agency, like the Department of Labor
or OSHA
d. Testified at a hearing/participated in an official investigation into
a claim
e. Other (SPECIFY)

7.

During the past 12 months, were there times when you DID NOT
complain, even though you had a problem at your job with dangerous
working conditions, discrimination, not being paid the minimum wage or
not being paid overtime? Again, I’m only talking about jobs you’ve held
here in CITY.
a.
b.

8.

Yes
No

What stopped you from complaining? Choose all that apply.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Afraid of losing your job
Afraid to say anything because of immigration status
Afraid of getting hours or wages cut
Afraid the company would close down
Seen other co-workers disciplined (fired, threatened or treated
badly) for speaking up
Did not know who to talk to or where to take the complaint
Employer made threats to you or your coworkers—if you filed a
complaint they would fire you, report you to immigration, etc
Didn’t think it would make a difference (tried in the past but
didn’t get anywhere)
Other (SPECIFY)
Survey Questions Related to Retaliation

Note: At this point in the survey, the respondent is being asked to focus on his or
her most recent complaint made within the past twelve months.
1.

Did your employer or supervisor know you made this complaint?
a. Yes
b. No
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2.

Did your employer or supervisor do any of the following as a direct result
of this complaint? Choose all that apply.
a. Did your employer or supervisor threaten to fire you or your
co-workers?
b. Did they threaten to call the police or immigration?
c. (Did they) threaten to close or move the company?
d. (Did they) fire you or your co-workers?
e. (Did they) suspend you or your co-workers?

3.

How about any of these? (Did your employer or supervisor do any of the
following as a direct result of this complaint?) Choose all that apply.
a. (Did they) cut your or your co-workers’ hours, or change your
schedules?
b. (Did they) cut your or your co-workers’ pay?
c. (Did they) give you or your co-workers worse work assignments?
d. (Did they) harass or abuse you or your co-workers?
e. Did your employer ignore you & did nothing?
f. Did your employer do anything else that I haven’t mentioned?
(SPECIFY)

Survey Questions Related to Substantive and Procedural Legal Knowledge
1.

Do you know where to file a complaint with the government if you are
having a problem with an employer?
a. Yes
b. No

2.

As far as you know, what is the current minimum wage in CITY?
a. ENTER AMOUNT

3.

As far as you know, do employers have to pay workers more than their
usual wage when they work more than 40 hours in a week?
a. Yes
b. No

4.

As far as you know, does the law allow employers to pay undocumented
workers less than the minimum wage?
a. Yes
b. No
Survey Questions Related to Social Networks

1.

First, I want you to think about ALL the people that you know
PERSONALLY. That means your family, your relatives and your friends,
but ALSO co-workers and people you know who you have seen in the past
SIX MONTHS. Don’t just tell me about people who you know really well,
but also people you see often or speak with regularly, including people in
your neighborhood. Now I’m going to read you a list of jobs, and ask you
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how many people you know who do each type of job. They should be
people who:
a. ARE 18 YEARS OLD OR OLDER.
b. ARE WORKING FOR SOMEONE ELSE: So if they own their
own business, or if they manage or supervise other people, don’t
count them.
c. ARE CURRENTLY WORKING here in LOCATION. You can
count people who are working off the books, and people who
don’t have their immigration papers. Here’s a map of
LOCATION.
2.

I’m going to read you a type of job, and for each, tell me how many
people you know who are currently working that type of job:
a.
b.

How about, security guards?
Teacher’s aides? Please do not count teachers, just teacher’s
aides.
c. People who work in private homes as nannies, domestic workers,
or housekeepers. Please don’t count teenagers or people who
babysit once in a while.
d. What about other child care workers, who either work in a day
care center, or take children into their own homes?
e. People who are housekeepers in hotels?
f. People who work in restaurants, bars, fast food places, cafeterias,
and other places where food or drinks are served. For example,
cooks, dishwashers, cashiers, bus boys, and waiters and
waitresses, and people who deliver food for restaurants.
g. Janitors or cleaners in buildings, hotels, or stores.
h. People who work in hair salons and nail salons. Please don’t
count people who own their own businesses.
i. People who work in residential construction, building or
remodeling single family homes or small apartment buildings.
This would include painters, laborers, drywall installers, and
roofers. Please do not count subcontractors, managers or crew
leaders, or skilled trades like electricians and plumbers.
j. Gardeners and landscapers. Please do not count subcontractors,
managers, or crew leaders.
k. People who work in car washes or as gas station attendants.
l. People who work as nursing aides in nursing homes
m. What about home health care workers, who take care of patients
in the patients’ homes?
n. People who work for dry cleaners or laundries, including laundry
plants.
o. People who work in food manufacturing, like meatpacking, food
processing and baking. Please count workers who operate
machines, work on assembly lines, pack products into boxes, or
move or ship those products. And please count people who work
at home doing food preparation for a company or restaurant.
p. People who work making clothes for companies. Please count
workers who sew, cut fabric, pack clothing into boxes or onto
hangers, and inspect finished products. And please count people
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who work in factories and also those who work out of their home
for a company.
q. People who work in furniture factories. Please don’t count
managers, just people who work on the shop floor.
r. People who do packing and moving jobs in warehouses.
s. People who work in grocery stores, drug stores, or supermarkets.
For example, cashiers and baggers, people who wash and sort
produce or who work in the stock room, as well as people who
make deliveries. Please do not count managers, pharmacists,
butchers or other specialty foodworkers, or people who work as
janitors and cleaners.
t. People who work in other kinds of retail stores, like department
stores, clothing stores, office supply stores, furniture stores, or
auto supply stores. Again, we are interested in people who work
as cashiers, on the shop floor helping customers, who make
deliveries, or who work in the stock room—but not janitors. And
don’t count people who work in a car dealership.
u. People who work as bank tellers.
v. People who repair cars. For example, people who do body work,
change tires, and make engine repairs, but who do not work for
an auto dealership.
w. People who work in parking garages, parking lots or as valet
parkers.
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APPENDIX B
Table 7. RDS Population Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals

Variable

Population
point estimate

Lower
confidence
interval

Upper
confidence
interval

Identified (perceived)
workplace problem in past
12 months

33.10%

30.71%

35.49%

Made claim about
workplace problem in past
12 months

56.87%

50.79%

62.95%

Made claim about
justiciable workplace
problem in past 12 months

65.12%

57.95%

72.28%

To employer

95.87%

95.87%

95.87%

To lawyer, union rep, or other
Intermediary

—

—

—

To government agency

—

—

—

Quality of worklife, e.g.
commute time,
workload, work
schedule

44.51%

35.13%

53.88%

Pay

39.73%

32.35%

47.11%

Method(s) of claiming

187

Subject(s) of claim

Discrimination,
harassment, or abuse

27.42%

19.34%

35.49%

Unsafe working conditions

—

—

—

Benefits

—

—

—

187. Because survey respondents were given the opportunity to choose more than one
answer to the questions concerning method of claiming, subject of claim, and the reason why
some respondents did not make a claim, those population point estimates refer to the
percentage of responses, not the percentage of respondents.
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Table 7 (continued)

Population
point estimate

Lower
confidence
interval

Upper
confidence
interval

Afraid would be fired

59.77%

55.90%

63.65%

Did not think claim would
make a difference

45.92%

42.35%

49.49%

Some other/miscellaneous
reason

25.48%

19.59%

31.36%

Saw others retaliated
against for making claims

14.28%

9.02%

19.53%

Afraid of hours/wages being
cut

11.97%

8.35%

15.59%

Did not know how to make a
claim

11.82%

5.73%

17.92%

Afraid due to immigration
status

—

—

—

Afraid due to employer threats

—

—

—

Afraid company would close

—

—

—

43.05%

39.80%

46.29%

Variable
Reason(s) for not making claim

Employer response to most recent
claim about justiciable
problem in past 12 months
Reprisals

34.73%

27.57%

41.89%

Addressed/promised to address
claim (resolution)

Unlawful retaliation

14.92%

9.64%

20.19%

Inaction/other response

—

—

—

Knows minimum wage and
overtime rights (substantive
legal knowledge)

41.01%

38.47%

43.55%

Knows where to file government
complaint (procedural
legal knowledge)

22.23%

20.05%

24.41%

Note: Because population point estimates are estimates, within upper and lower confidence
intervals, not all sets of figures for a given variable will sum to 100%. In addition, some
variables had too few observations within the data set for RDSAT to generate a population
point estimate. These are indicated with a dash in the relevant field.
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APPENDIX C
Table 8. Logistic Regression Results: Workplace Problems
Statistical
significance (pvalue)

Independent variable

Coefficient

Robust
standard error

Female

-.2064162**

.0935926

0.027

Black or African American

-.1831411

.1394766

0.189

Asian or other race

-.0692085

.1399979

0.621

White

-.1969036

.209114

0.346

Age (log)

-.3902301***

.1420976

0.006

Years of education (log)

.2263875***

.0826076

0.006

No legal immigration status

.1579034

.1187964

0.184

Does not know minimum wage
and overtime rights
(substantive legal knowledge)

-.0122081

.095769

0.899

Does not know where to file
government complaint
procedural legal knowledge)

.2377473**

.1098959

0.031

Not a union member

-.2904993

†

.1879356

0.122

Job tenure of fewer than 12
months

-.2210349*

.1168781

0.059

Employer has fewer than 100
employees

-.322473***

.1033499

0.002

Employer is not “high road”
Constant

.4308615***
.5335444

.1103767
.6071023

0.000
0.379

Note: Dependent variable = Respondent identified workplace problem in 12 months
before survey (0,1).
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15
Number of observations

3620

Wald chi2(13)

59.60

Prob > chi2

0.0000

Pseudo R2

0.0216

Log pseudolikelihood

-2237.3288

Base category (constant)

Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal immigration status;
has substantive legal knowledge; has procedural legal
knowledge; union member; job tenure of 12 or more
months; employer has 100 or more employees;
employer is “high road”
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Table 9. Logistic Regression Results: Claims

Independent variable

Coefficient

Robust
standard
error

Statistical
significance
(p-value)

Female

-0.0527787

0.1440536

0.714

Black or African American

-0.0707228

0.2309246

0.759

†

0.2337536

0.103

White

0.0757693

0.3396625

0.823

Age (log)

-0.3275930†

0.2170615

0.131

Years of education (log)

0.1323876

0.1239154

0.285

No legal immigration status

-0.1132518

0.1902730

0.552

Does not know minimum wage and
overtime rights (substantive legal
knowledge)

-0.2655614*

0.1484176

0.074

Does not know where to file government
complaint (procedural legal
knowledge)

-0.3736151**

0.1823592

0.040

0.3175203

0.147

0.1740706

0.001

Asian or other race

-0.3814158

†

Not a union member

-0.4599542

Job tenure of fewer than 12 months

-0.5530929***

Employer has fewer than 100 employees

-0.0815789

0.1637656

0.618

Employer is not “high road”

-0.3828674*

0.1961185

0.051

Constant

2.7929570

0.9305910

0.003

Note: Dependent variable = Respondent made claim about workplace problem in 12
months before survey (0,1).
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15
Number of observations

1422

Wald chi2(13)

38.84

Prob > chi2

0.0002

Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikelihood

0.0380
-901.68482

Base category (constant)

Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal
immigration status; has substantive legal
knowledge; has procedural legal knowledge;
union member; job tenure of 12 or more
months; employer has 100 or more
employees; employer is “high road.”
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Table 10. Logistic Regression Results: Retaliation

Independent variable

Coefficient

Robust
standard
error

Statistical
significance
(p-value)

Female

-0.2982914

0.2634372

0.258

Black or African American

-0.5121672

0.3697562

0.166

Asian or other race

0.2198756

0.4566514

0.630

White

-0.0897640

0.4907023

0.855

Age (log)

0.4817006

0.3979467

0.226

Years of education (log)

-0.1829480

0.2287591

0.424

No legal immigration status

0.4604266

0.3412907

0.177

Not a union member

-0.7078947

0.5087682

0.164

Job tenure of fewer than 12 months

-0.1129911

0.3613206

0.754

Employer has fewer than 100 employees

-0.0887306

0.3109330

0.775

Employer is not “high road”

0.4319436

0.3192539

0.176

Made claim alone

-0.4446391*

0.2584028

0.085

Constant

0.2221966

1.5574580

0.887

Note: Dependent variable = Respondent experienced retaliation as a result of most recent
claim about justiciable workplace problem within 12 months before survey (0,1).
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15
Number of observations

560

Wald chi2(12)

17.55

Prob > chi2

0.1301

Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikelihood

0.0430
-313.31388

Base category (constant)

Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal
immigration status; union member; job tenure
of 12 or more months; employer has 100 or
more employees; employer is “high road”;
made claim with other workers.
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Table 11. Logistic Regression Results: Substantive Legal Knowledge

Independent variable

Coefficient

Robust
standard
error

Female

0.0120387

0.0929117

0.897

Black or African American

-0.5531989***

0.1376899

0.000

0.1411088

0.142

†

Statistical
significance
(p-value)

Asian or other race

-0.2072459

White

-0.8291724***

0.2288281

0.000

Age (log)

-0.5192653***

0.1412215

0.000

Years of education (log)

-0.0775112

0.0796029

0.330

0.1202510

0.147

†

No legal immigration status

0.1742892

Does not know where to file government
complaint (procedural legal
knowledge)

-0.0930504

0.1068239

0.384

Not a union member

0.3069922*

0.1849017

0.097

Job tenure of fewer than 12 months

0.0398983

0.1148611

0.728

Employer has fewer than 100 employees

-0.6794804***

0.1029398

0.000

Employer is not “high road”

0.1127068

0.1101022

0.306

Constant

1.8517130

0.6169684

0.003

Note: Dependent variable = Respondent knows minimum wage and overtime rights (0,1).
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15
Number of observations

3620

Wald chi2(12)

96.42

Prob > chi2

0.0000

Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikelihood

0.0356
-2302.8753

Base category (constant)

Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal immigration
status; has procedural legal knowledge; union
member; job tenure of 12 or more months;
employer has 100 or more employees;
employer is “high road.”
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Table 12. Logistic Regression Results: Procedural Legal Knowledge

Independent variable

Coefficient

Robust
standard
error

Statistical
significance
(p-value)

Female

-0.5572914***

0.1060106

0.000

Black or African American

0.3197659**

0.1425108

0.025

Asian or other race

-0.3812027**

0.1536963

0.013

White

0.0593975

0.2199687

0.787

Age (log)

0.7814716***

0.1601408

0.000

Years of education (log)

0.2641330**

0.1036941

0.011

No legal immigration status

-0.9870480***

0.1465031

0.000

Does not know minimum wage and
overtime rights (substantive legal
knowledge)

-0.0816583

0.1071086

0.446

Not a union member

-0.2234331

0.1967807

0.256

Job tenure of fewer than 12 months

-0.1341045

0.1382338

0.332

Employer has fewer than 100 employees

-0.1500885

0.1172208

0.200

Employer is not “high road”

-0.3894764***

0.1199624

0.001

Constant

-3.1797170

0.6946226

0.000

Note: Dependent variable = Respondent knows where to file government complaint (0,1).
***p ≤ 0.01; **p ≤ 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10; †p ≤ 0.15
Number of observations

3606

Wald chi2(12)

198.28

Prob > chi2

0.0000

Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikelihood

0.0921

Base category (constant)

Male; Latino/a or Hispanic; legal immigration
status; has substantive legal knowledge; union
member; job tenure of 12 or more months;
employer has 100 or more employees;
employer is “high road.”

-1787.7217

